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JAPAN AND THE MONEYLENDERS—
ACTIVIST COURTS AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE
Andrew M. Pardieck†
Abstract: Problems with sub-prime loans roiled financial markets worldwide in
2007 and brought renewed attention to predatory lending practices by loan brokers in the
United States. Questionable lending practices, however, plague consumer financial
markets worldwide, including one of the largest, found in Japan. This Article addresses
the Japanese response to systemic problems in its consumer finance market. Over the last
forty years, the judiciary has led and the Diet followed. Most recently, in 2006, the
Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions that turned the single most important
earnings driver for the consumer finance industry into dead letter law. The Diet followed
with legislative revisions. Both actions have imposed restrictions unheard of in the
United States and drastically reshaped the financial industry in Japan. This Article
analyzes these recent changes and places them in context. Doing so offers more than
description and a point of comparison. It provides a window into the evolution of
Japanese private law. It provides evidence that challenges the conventional wisdom on
Japan. The Japanese judiciary is neither weak nor ineffectual. It is not limited to
following the dictates of the Liberal Democratic Party or bureaucracy or filling in
legislative lacuna. It has not limited itself to activism in the service of stability or
community. In private law matters, it has come to act aggressively: repeatedly
invalidating black letter law and providing substantive as opposed to procedural justice.
This work shows the Japanese judiciary has not evolved into a monolithic bureaucracy,
but one often driven by activist lower courts. The historical context and discussion of
recent developments in consumer finance law offers insight into legal changes affecting
the Japanese financial markets today, as well as the evolution of the role of law and the
rule of law in Japan.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Even with the uptick in Japan’s economy,1 after fifteen years of
recession and stagnation, the numbers are still pretty bleak. In 2006, one in
every nine Japanese, one in every seven adults, was indebted to a lender
†
Andrew M. Pardieck, Affiliate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law,
Seattle; Of Counsel, The Pardieck Law Firm. This Article was written while a Visiting Scholar at the
University of Washington. I would like to thank Rob Britt, Lawton Hawkings, Naoki Iwamoto, Mark
Levin, Luke Nottage, Ken Port, Veronica Taylor, Mark Ramseyer, Nobuhisa Segawa, Hiroo Sono, and
Megan Starich for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors or omissions are solely mine, as are
the translations unless otherwise noted. Translations of statutes follow the article, paragraph, item format
established in the government’s Standard Bilingual Legal Dictionary (Mar. 2006), http://www.cas.go.jp/
jp/seisaku/hourei/dictionary.pdf. Where available, cases are cited to the Supreme Court’s web site rather
than a commercial reporter. Historical materials are cited to the original and if reproduced in whole or part
in modern secondary sources to those as well.
1
See, e.g., Patrick Barta, Markets Brace for Impact Of Japan's Growing Hunger, WALL ST. J., May
16, 2006, at C1; Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, Rising Sun: After Long Decline, Japan's Economy Is
Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1; Andrew Morse, Japan Data Bolster Case For Growth,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A11; Akane Vallery Uchida & Andrew Morse, Land Prices in Japan
Reverse Slide, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2007 at A5.
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reporting to the Federation of Credit Bureaus of Japan.2 Out of a population
of approximately 127 million people,3 over 22 million were registered with
the federation, including 14 million currently in debt, double that from
1991.4
The majority of Japan’s borrowers are temporary workers and
pensioners.5 Most remain in debt for 6.5 years; approximately 30% remain
in debt for ten years or more.6 In 2006, approximately 2.3 million borrowers
were classified as heavily in debt, in debt to five or more lenders,7 and 2.7
million were behind on payments to consumer finance companies and in
default.8
Actual numbers then and now are likely much worse. Government
statistics from 2005 showed over 14,000 money lenders registered with
either the central or a local government and only 2079 members of the
Federation of Credit Bureaus.9 In other words, a large number of lenders are
not using established credit bureaus and their borrowers are not included in
the above statistics.10
2

Utsunomiya Kenji, Kashikingyō Kisei no Kadai—Shōhisha no Tachiba Kara, 1319 JURISTO 13, 19

(2006).
3

STATISTICS BUREAU, JAPAN MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND COMMC’N, STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK OF JAPAN 8 (2007), available at http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/handbook/c02cont.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2007); Statistics Bureau, Population Estimates: Monthly Report, Nov. 1, 2007 (Final
Estimates), http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/tsuki/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2008).
4
Shōhisha Kinyū, Seigenhō Kosu Risoku: “Hai-iro Kinri” Jisshitsu Hitei, ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 14,
2006, at 43; Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 13.
5
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19.
6
Id. at 17.
7
Akemi Nakamura, Will Lending Law Revision Put Brakes on Debt-Driven Suicide?, THE JAPAN
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006; Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14.
8
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14.
9
Id.; Zenkoku Shinyō Jōhō Senta-Rengoukai, Zenjōren Tōkei, http://www.fcbj.jp/data/
figures/index.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
10
Straight comparisons with the United States are difficult. The Federal Reserve in its most recent
2004 survey of consumer finance offers statistics per family instead of per individual. The share of
families carrying debt was 76.4%; however, 47.9% of this total was debt secured by a primary residence,
i.e. a home mortgage. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. Bull. (2006), at A26, 30-31, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf. Credit cards are another primary
source of debt: in 2004, 46.2% of families carried a median credit card balance of $2200. Distressed debt
indicators for 2004 showed 12.2% of families carrying income to debt ratios of over 40% and 8.9% of
families delinquent on at least one debt payment. See id. at A35. Non-business bankruptcy filings trended
upward from 1996 through 2006, spiked in 2005, and then plummeted in 2006 because of the changes
brought about by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act. American
Bankruptcy Institute, 2006 Bankruptcies Fall to Lowest Levels Since 1980s (Apr. 17, 2007),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CO
NTENTID=46645; American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year
1980-2006
(Aug.
16,
2007),
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&
TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=46621. Payday lending in the United States offers
an additional point of comparison. The industry did not exist before the 1990s, and by 2004 estimates
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Most borrowers borrow down, starting with mainstream consumer
finance companies, and after exhausting their credit with those sources,
moving to the mid-size and small consumer finance companies, and then the
black market.11 Many file for bankruptcy, 184,422 in 2005, sixteen times
more than in 1990.12 Many attempt to disappear or “run away under the
cover of night” (yonige). The numbers are hard to believe, but some
estimate as many as 100,000 each year.13 Interviews show that many wind
up homeless.14 Others resort to suicide.15 In 2005, 32,522 committed
suicide, including 7756 for economic reasons, a slight improvement from the
high in 2003.16 In comparison, the number of fatalities from traffic accidents
in Japan is below 7000. 17
In December 2006, the Japanese Diet acted, but they did not act in
response to these numbers. The numbers peaked in 2003.18 They acted in
response to the Japanese Supreme Court. In the first three months of 2006,
the Supreme Court handed down six decisions interpreting Japan’s usury
laws and the laws regulating the consumer finance industry.19 All of them
overturned lower court decisions for the lender; the combination of them
turned statutory law into dead letter law.20 The bureaucracy and the Diet
suggested there were over 22,000 payday lenders nationwide with a loan volume of over $40 billion. Joe
Mahon, Banking on the Fringe, FEDGAZETTE (July 2004), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
pubs/fedgaz/04-07/banking.cfm#. Industry analysts have estimated that about 5% of the U.S. population
has taken out payday loans at some point; many become chronic borrowers, with surveys suggesting over
40% both roll over their loans and borrow from multiple lenders. See Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris,
Payday Lending: A Business Model that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8, 14, 19-21
(2003), available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/CC_Payday_lending.pdf.
11
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19. See Akemi Nakamura & Mayumi Negishi, Consumer Lenders’
Dirty but Open Secret, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 18, 2006.
12
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14; Kinyūchō, Kashikingyō Seido Nado ni Kansuru Kondankai no
Kaisai ni Tsuite, TŌKEI SHIRYŌ NADO, http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2007).
13
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 15-16.
14
Id.
15
For a discussion suggesting a causal link between suicide and insolvency law, see MARK D. WEST,
LAW IN EVERYDAY JAPAN: SEX, SUMO, SUICIDE AND STATUTES 223-65 (2005).
16
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 15-16; Kinyūcho, Kashikingyō Seido Nado ni Kansuru Kondankai
no Kaisai ni Tsuite, TŌKEI SHIRYŌ NADO, http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
17
Japan to Tackle High Suicide Rate, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/asia-pacific/5082616.stm.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 361-362.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 318-339. Blackstone noted that money lent on contract for
compensation “is called interest by those who think it legal, and usury by those who do not so.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *454. This Article uses the term without intending any such distinction
but rather to describe the practice of lending money at a high rate of interest. According to Black’s, usury
is defined as “[h]istorically, the lending of money with interest” and today as “the charging of an illegal
rate of interest” or “[a]n illegally high rate of interest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (8th ed. 2004).
20
See infra text accompanying notes 318-339.
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played catch-up and when they caught up with legislation in 2006, they
came down relatively hard on usury and the money lending industry in
Japan. Henceforth, for the finance companies in Japan, there are new
interest rate caps, new duties imposed on the lenders, and increased criminal
penalties; for the consumer, there is less credit. 21
The new legislation is the latest addition to a history of legislative and
judicial efforts to regulate money lending in Japan that stretches back over
eight hundred years.22 Like usury law in the West, these efforts provide an
opportunity to examine an evolution in legal norms governing a basic
transaction that remains fundamentally unchanged: lending money at
interest. An examination of that evolution in Japan shows, in a microcosm,
the history and evolution of private law in Japan: 1) from an early, welldeveloped policy and practice of micro-managing private law for public
purposes, 2) to a private law regime embracing “freedom of contract” and
judicial restraint, 3) to a paternalistic conception of private law driven by the
judiciary.23
This new legislation, when placed in context, shows that the Japanese
judiciary, an institution often characterized as conservative and ineffectual,
can and does act as a “liberal” and decisive force within Japanese society.
Judicial activism is not limited to “activism in the service of stability,” or
even activism in the service of community.24 The judiciary does more than
simply fill in legislative lacunae.25
In the areas of usury law and consumer finance in Japan, instead of
jury nullification, one finds judicial nullification. The judiciary has rejected
attempts by the bureaucracy and Diet to legislatively revise judicially
established norms. It has cast itself as an arbiter of societal norms and,
through a technical application of the law, imposed substantive as opposed
to procedural justice. In this area of private law, the judiciary has driven the
bureaucracy and Diet. In this area of the law, the judiciary has radically

21

See infra text accompanying notes 411-456.
See, e.g., ONO SHŪSEI, RISOKU SEIGENHŌ TO KŌJO RYŌZOKU 208 (1999); 1 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN 120 (1969).
23
In the civil law tradition, “[l]aw is divided up into clearly delimited fields. Public law and private
law . . . are treated as inherently different and clearly distinguishable.” JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION 63, 68, 91 (2d ed. 1985).
24
See Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service
of – Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 638 (1996). See also JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE
LAW 124 (1998).
25
See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy and the Public Trust
(Aug. 23, 2003) (unpublished paper), available at http://law.wustl.edu/higls/papers/lectures/20033HaleyJapaneseJudiciary.html#_ftnref3).
22
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changed the governing legal norms, which, in turn, in 2006 radically
changed the financial markets in Japan.
Finally, this legislation, placed in context, shines light on a Japanese
society that is still coming to terms with the bursting of the Japanese
economic bubble fifteen years ago.26 Fifteen years of painful economic
restructuring has changed the balance of power. The 2006 legislative
process suggests there are increasingly powerful younger members of the
Liberal Democratic Party (“LDP”) responsible to a constituency stretching
beyond traditional business interests, and increasingly large, but often
muted, foreign stakeholders.
This Article will examine each of these points. Part II will examine
the legislative and judicial history of interest rate restriction laws as well as
the judicial precedent that preceded the 2006 legislation. It will briefly
examine the law governing money lending found in the Tokugawa era
(1603-1867), followed by the legislative reforms that accompanied the Meiji
Reformation, and the decisions from the Great Court of Cassation, imperial
Japan’s highest court. Part II will focus though on the legislation and
caselaw that followed the end of World War II and preceded the changes in
2006. Part III will examine the impetus for the the 2006 legislative reforms,
the outlines of the new lending laws, and the aftermath, including the
restructuring of the consumer financial markets in Japan. Part IV will seek
to place this discussion in a broader context. Discussion of whether
Japanese law permits 12% or 15% interest or whether the Japanese courts
deem certain payments “construed interest” or not, without more, would
scarcely justify the paper and ink expended. Part V argues that there is
more; that usury law, as dry as it sounds, offers broad insights into the role
of law and the rule of law in Japan.
II.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY

A.

The Tokugawa Era

Usury laws in Japan date back at least to the Kamakura Dynasty
(1185-1336).27 There was not a total prohibition against lending money at
interest, as seen in Western Europe, but abundant records detail prohibitions
26
In 1989 the Tokyo Stock Exchange had a market value of $4.3 trillion and was the largest in the
world having surpassed even that of the New York Stock Exchange. In 1991 the Bubble burst and by 1995
the market value of the Tokyo exchange had declined to $3.6 trillion, or roughly 60% of the New York
Stock Exchange. See Sekai no Shuyō Kabushiki Shijō, ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 13; Shinichi
Terada, Lending Legislation Reforms Spell Industry Shakeout, THE JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, available
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nb20061214a2.html.
27
1 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 120.
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on interest due on bills of exchange.28 Records from the Muromachi Period
(1336-1573) detail more inclusive interest rate restrictions: interest rates on
all money loans were capped at 5% per month.29
The records from both of these periods, however, are spotty. It was
not until after the Warring States Period (1467-1583), the subsequent
unification of Japan, and the beginning of the extended rule of the Tokugawa
Shogunate (1603-1867) that we see a comprehensive treatment of usury law.
The Tokugawa Shogunate created an extensive body of law, both judicial
precedent and administrative orders, which wholly endorsed government
restriction of money lending at interest.30
Early on, the Tokugawa government established a maximum interest
rate of 20% per annum with criminal penalties assessed on rates over 30%,31
and for pawnbrokers a graduated scale from 36% to 20% decreasing with the
size of the loan.32 They fiddled with those numbers incessantly, capping
interest rates at one point at 5%, at another point declaring the “proper rate”
15%, and later 12%.33 The government would also ex post adjust interest
rates.34 In 1729, it reduced interest rate charges to 5% on all outstanding
loans concluded between 1702 and 1729, noting that after the recoinage of
gold and silver in the Genroku Period (1688-1704) the price of grain
advanced considerably and then fell, but “the interest on loans and pledges
remains the same as before, to the great embarrassment of the people.”35
Despite considerable barriers to litigation,36 cases relating to money
lending were widely adjudicated and the procedures for such suits well

28

See id.
ONO, supra note 22, at 208.
30
At the same time, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Sir William Blackstone were writing in
defense of usury and England was moving towards the abolition of its usury laws. See Carl F. Taeusch,
The Concept of “Usury” the History of an Idea, 3 J. HIST. IDEAS 291, 306, 310 (1942). See also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *454-56.
31
Nishimura Nobuo, Shin Risoku Seigenhō Hihan (1), 29 MINSHŌHŌ ZASSHI (No. 6) 387, 389
(1954); ONO, supra note 22, at 201.
32
In 1692, the Tokugawa Shogunate promulgated regulations for pawnbrokers restricting interest
rates to 36% for loans up to 100 mon, 28% for loans under 2 ryō; 24% for loans under 10 ryō; 20% for
loans up to 100 ryō; and less than 20% for loans over 100 ryō. Nishimura, supra note 31, at 398.
33
See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 256-62; 333-34; Nishimura, supra note 31, at 398.
34
See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 256, 259.
35
Id. at 256.
36
Apart from the “didactic conciliation” mandated by the Tokugawa authorities and documented by
Professor Henderson, Professor Wigmore notes “one of the reasons why the mercantile classes resorted so
little to the courts in their disputes was the necessity of humiliating themselves so deeply in their quest for
justice—of crawling, for instance, on hands and knees from the door of the court to the judgment room.” 1
WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 41. See also DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW :
TOKUGAWA AND MODERN (1965).
29
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established.37 The numbers, however, periodically threatened to overwhelm
the courts. At one point, the Chamber of Decisions, Tokugawa Japan’s
highest court, complained that money actions have “increased to such an
extent that, if we are to try all of them, as we do now, the court days of the
Chamber . . . will be occupied with those actions exclusively . . . [and] the
morale of the Chamber may degenerate.”38 No self-respecting samuraimagistrate could tolerate listening to money suits all day, and the Council of
State responded by limiting the dates on which money suits would be
heard.39
The magistrates also sought to limit practice before the courts by
creditors, citing “many vicious practices”:
[T]he creditor sometimes sends to court some person skilled in
litigation [to represent him], pretending that this man is his
dependent relative or servant. . . . Again, some instigate
unfounded suits for some petty arrearage against country
people, knowing that the latter, even when they have no
recollection of the claim, would rather pay some proportion of
it in settlement than undertake the expense of coming to the city
to defend the suit. Moreover, we hear that sometimes a person
takes advantage of the poverty or ignorance of another, and in
lending him money takes an instrument of land pledge,
stipulating usurious interest, and afterwards alters the
arrangement into a contract of renting.40
The magistrates argued and the Council of State agreed that this conduct—
skilled representation, extorted settlements, and fraud—could not be stopped
absent penalty. They proposed that a litigant falsely putting forward a
person skilled in litigation be punished.41
The Chamber of Decisions employed other means to regulate actions
involving the lending of money at interest. It periodically dismissed all of
them.42 It issued “private settlement orders” in 1719 and again in 1797,
noting in the latter that borrowing money “originates as a matter of private
arrangement between the parties, and hence there is no necessity for

37
See CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868, 108-19, 147 (1991); 3
WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 7-8, 43-47.
38
3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 54.
39
The negative response to this kind of suit was “[a] not unnatural notion of samurai.” Id. at 54 n.6.
40
Id. at 19.
41
See id.
42
See id. at 1-2.
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undertaking and judging disputes of that sort.”43 Actions on money suits
“must necessarily mean lack of sincerity in both the borrower and lender.” 44
Orders stipulated that the parties were to carry out their obligations with a
“true sense of their mutual duties,” and those who did not would be
“punished severely.”45
The Tokugawa rulers were aware of the consequences of intervention.
In 1842, a town magistrate argued that “the failure of debtors to repay their
borrowings has recently become so frequent that . . . the circulation of
money is at present very sluggish.”46 The magistrate argued that private
settlement orders “injuriously affected” money circulation and caused men
to become “more and more self-willed and shameless,” borrowing money
with the intent to delay payment.47 “In seeking to cure these evils and that of
the inactive circulation of money,” reform of the laws was necessary “so as
to facilitate legal proceedings as much as possible and give the creditor a
guarantee that he shall obtain satisfaction without fail.”48
In 1843, the Council of State adopted regulations to do just that,
providing for regular court hearings and imprisonment for failure to pay,
execution of property and liability for any remaining debts, penalties for
secreting property, and no statute of limitations.49 In less than a year,
however, the Council again dismissed all money suits, deciding that “out of
compassion” for the heavy debt loads and “unfortunate condition” of
numerous families of the military gentry they would change the
regulations.50 The Tokugawa government again dismissed all pending
money suits.51 Interest rates remained capped at 12% per annum until the
beginning of the Meji Reformation.52
B.

The Meiji, Taisho, and Pre-World War II Showa Eras

The Meiji Reformation brought major changes. After a brief civil
war, the Tokugawa government fell, and, on January 3, 1868, the Meiji
Emperor was “restored.”53 The Meiji government initially decreed that the
43

Id. at 1-3, 324-25.
Id.
45
Id. at 324-25, 334.
46
Id. at 321-23.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 323-47; ONO, supra note 22, at 214.
50
3 WIGMORE, supra note 22, at 333-34.
51
Id.
52
Id.; ONO, supra note 22, at 201.
53
MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 61 (2d ed. 2002). Scholars suggest the Meiji
Restoration came about “as a unifying political force through the inter-related political processes of ‘revival
44
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Tokugawa era laws would continue to apply.54 However, in 1871 the Great
Council of State (dajōkan), an institution surviving from the imperial court,55
issued Order No. 31, abolishing Tokugawa usury restrictions and declaring
that, henceforth, parties to a civil contract were free to set their own interest
rates.56
This freedom was short-lived.57 In 1877, the Meiji government
reintroduced comprehensive interest rate restrictions, albeit without any
criminal penalties.58 By Order No. 66, the Council promulgated the Interest
Rate Restriction Act (“Meiji IRRA”) and, in doing so, established a
regulatory paradigm that continues today.59 Article 1 divided interest rates
on money loans into those established by law and those established by
contract.60 For the latter, Article 2 permitted interest rates up to 20% per
annum on loans under ¥100, up to 15% on loans between ¥100 and ¥1000,
and up to 12% on loans over ¥1000. Interest payments in excess of these
limits were “void before the court” (saiban jo mukō).61 Interest otherwise
denominated, including “appreciation fees” and “thanks money,” were “void
before the court.”62 Liquidated damages provisions were subject to
reduction by the court to reflect actual damages.63
Debate regarding freedom of contract lasted longer. The French legal
scholar Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie arrived in Japan in 1873,64
and his draft of the Civil Code specifically contemplated interest rate
restrictions.65 The Codification Investigation Committee’s debate over
Boissonade’s draft in toto was perfunctory, but debate over his interest rate
of monarchal government’ (ōsei fukkō), ‘return of the people and land to the emperor’ (hanseki hōkan), and
‘abolition of fiefs and establishment of prefectures’ (haihan chiken).” Ken Mukai & Nobuyoshi Toshitani,
The Progress and Problems of Compiling the Civil Code in the Early Meiji Era, in 1 LAW IN JAPAN 25, 31
(Dan Fenno Henderson trans., 1967).
54
ONO, supra note 22, at 202-03 (quoting Minbukan Futatsu No. 506 of June 4, 1869).
55
Mukai & Toshitani, supra note 53, at 28 note c.
56
ONO, supra note 22, at 203 (quoting Dajōkan Fukoku No. 31 of Jan. 18, 1871); Nishimura, supra
note 31, at 389.
57
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 389.
58
Id. at 389, 391. For further discussion of law without sanctions in Japan, see John O. Haley,
Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265,
272 (1982).
59
Dajōkan Fukoku 66 of September 11, 1877 [Great Council of State Order No. 66 of 1877],
http://dajokan.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/index.pl (follow "検索画面へ" hyperlink; enter"利息制限法" in
the"法令名" field and "66" in the "法令番号等" field; follow "検索実行"). (last visited Feb. 14, 2007)
[hereinafter Meiji IRRA].
60
Id. art. 1.
61
Id. art. 2.
62
Id. art. 4.
63
Id. art. 5.
64
ONO, supra note 22, at 215 n. 20.
65
Id. at 216-17.
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provision lasted for two days.66 Opponents argued that Boissonade’s draft
was paternalistic and counter to the philosophy of freedom of contract that
underlay the new Civil Code; it would restrict finance and harm borrowers.67
In the end, both the 1890 Civil Code first promulgated and the 1896 Civil
Code later adopted offered the exact opposite of Boissonade’s draft.68 The
parties were free to establish interest rates in excess of the default rate by
agreement, and remedies in the case of any illegal charges were limited to a
refusal to pay the same.69 Opponents of Boissonade’s draft followed this
victory with proposals in May and June 1895 to abolish the Meiji IRRA, but
were unsuccessful.70 The Civil Code, as revised, and the Meiji IRRA, as
earlier established, represented a compromise.71 The result is that the
current Civil Code provides a general rule of freedom of contract,
establishes a legal interest rate that acts as a default, and is silent with regard
to interest rate restrictions.72 The current IRRA operates as a special law
within this framework.73
This tension between a newly espoused freedom of contract and
legislative restrictions on money lending was reflected in the judicial
decisions of the imperial courts. The issue that confronted the Tokugawa
magistrates, whether to allow the parties to structure their own transactions
or interfere, remained, but the judicial decisions now reflected a distinct bias
towards the former. The Great Court of Cassation, a high court based on the
French model established in 1875,74 applied the Meiji IRRA where
necessary and limited its application where possible.
The court early on addressed whether interest rate restrictions were
applicable to non-monetary loans, and it repeatedly said no.75 Courts began
66

Id. at 218.
Id.; Ōkawa Sumio, Meiji Minpō no Hensan to Risoku Seigen Hō, 6 RITSUMEIKAN RONSHŪ 102,
103, 112 (2003).
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For an explanation of the Civil Code controversy, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT
POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 75-77 (1991); Mukai & Toshitani, supra note 53, at 25;
Richard W. Rabinowitz, Law and the Social Process in Japan, 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY
OF JAPAN (3d Series) 11 (1968).
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ONO, supra note 22, at 218.
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Id. at 219, 230. Opponents of the law called it an “empty act” (tohō) at odds with basic economics
and the evolution of law from restriction to freedom. Proponents argued the law remained necessary
providing a remedy, at the court’s discretion, for immoral behavior. See Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 104-05,
111.
71
ONO, supra note 22, at 219, 230.
72
Id. at 221.
73
Id.
74
HALEY, supra note 68, at 69.
75
4 DAIHAN MINROKU 30 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Feb. 17, 1898); 9 DAIHAN MINROKU 101 (Great
Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 22, 1901); 13 DAIHAN MINROKU 716 (Great Ct. of Cassation, June 26, 1907); 27
DAIHAN MINROKU 939 (Great Ct. of Cassation May 18, 1921); Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391.
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emphasizing that the law was “in contravention of the principle of freedom
of contract,” and though perhaps necessary to prevent harm arising from
unreasonable profits, not to be expanded.76 When the courts found the
statute applicable, they were required to interpret the “void before the
courts” language in Article 2, and refused to enforce lenders’ claims to
excessive interest charges not yet paid.77 At the same time, they rejected
borrowers’ claims for refund of excessive interest paid so long as it was
“voluntarily paid.”78 Other courts focused on the agreement of the parties
with the same result. According to a 1909 decision, if “it had been paid
based on the agreement of the parties,” it was not amenable to a claim for
refund.79 If a contract calling for illegal interest was made and illegal
interest voluntarily paid, then it was not only the creditor but also the debtor
who had engaged in an illegal act.80
In 1919, with the end of World War I and poor economic conditions,81
the government lowered the maximum interest rate in the Meiji IRRA to
15%.82 Yet the courts continued to conservatively interpret the act. In a
1921 case, the court affirmed, where the debtor has agreed to pay “without
any reservation . . . they cannot demand the return of the payment made in
excess.”83 The courts would closely examine whether at the time of
payment the party “registered any objection” to the usurious interest rate.84
Debtors routinely made the argument that interest rates in excess of the caps
were void as against public policy, and the courts routinely rejected it.85 In
the absence of inappropriate or “cruel circumstances,” such contracts could
exist within the “range of the freedom of contract.”86

76

24 DAIHAN MINROKU 67 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Jan. 28, 1918). See also ONO, supra note 22, at

77

Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391; Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 102, 103.
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391; Ōkawa, supra note 67, at 102, 103.
15 DAIHAN MINROKU 649 (Great Ct. of Cassation, July 3, 1909). See also ONO, supra note 22, at

242.
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248.
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8 DAIHAN MINROKU 134 (Great Ct. of Cassation Oct. 25, 1902).
Risoku Seigen Mondō, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Mar. 15, 1919, at 2.
82
See Risoku Seigenhō [Interest Rate Restriction Act (Amendment)], Law No. 59 of 1919. See also
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 397; ONO, supra note 22, at 221. The Diet reduced the top rate to 15% on
loans below ¥100, 12% on loans between ¥100 and ¥1000, and 10% on loans over ¥1000. ONO, supra note
22, at 221.
83
27 DAIHAN MINROKU 475 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Mar. 5, 1920). See also ONO, supra note 22, at
254.
84
ONO, supra note 22, at 255-57.
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3281 HŌRITSU SHINBUN 9 (Great Ct. of Cassation, May 23, 1931); 4 HŌGAKU 1568 (Great Ct. of
Cassation, Apr. 26, 1935). See also ONO, supra note 22, at 290-91.
86
10 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 69 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Feb. 13, 1931); ONO, supra note 22, at 255, 29091.
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While courts were loath to expand the scope of the law, as with the
Tokugawa courts, they did not countenance attempts to circumvent it. The
statute is silent as to discounted interest, defined as prepaid interest
subtracted from the loan proceeds provided to the debtor.87 Where the
borrower received ¥1480 on a loan of ¥4300, the Court of Cassation found
the borrower received an economic benefit from only the money received
and, as a result, no contractual debt arose with regard to the deducted interest
and fees.88 Subsequent courts agreed explaining that to hold otherwise
“would allow evasion” of the Meiji IRRA.89 The courts had little difficulty
reaching a similar conclusion regarding “compensation fees” paid for loans,
deeming them construed interest.90 Investigative fees which were in reality
“means by the creditor to obtain monetary profits in excess of the interest
rate restrictions” were also “void before the court.”91
Scholars have argued the courts’ focus on the agreement of the parties
and voluntary payment literally took the teeth out of the law.92 These cases
suggest the courts were not willing to countenance creditors evading the
statute, but they were not willing to extend the protection of the statute
further.
C.

The Post-World War II Showa and Heisei Eras

World War II brought substantial changes to the money lending
industry. In 1939, the Diet adopted the Finance Industry Control Regulation
which, under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Department, created
a licensing system for the lending industry, prohibited misleading
advertising, and required written loan contracts.93 In the midst of the turmoil
and high interest rates after the war, the new government issued a Price
Control Order in 1946 and adopted the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment
Act in 1947.94 The former prohibited excessive profits.95 The latter allowed
87
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9 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 49 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Jan. 28, 1930).
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10 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1159 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Dec. 3, 1931); 14 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1211 (Great
Ct. of Cassation, May 8, 1935). See also ONO, supra note 22, at 265-66.
90
2051 HŌRITSU SHINBUN 20 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 5, 1922). See also ONO, supra note 22,
at 266.
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15 DAIHAN MINSHŪ 1843 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 23, 1936). See also ONO, supra note 22, at
268.
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Nishimura, supra note 31, at 391.
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Kinyūgyō Torshimari Kisoku [Financial Industry Regulation], Metropolitan Police Order No. 29
of 1939; ONO, supra note 22, at 221.
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Bukka Tōsei Rei [Price Control Order], Order No. 118 of 1946, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/htmldata/S21/S21CO118.html (last visted at Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Price Control Order];
Rinji Kinri Chōseihō [Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Act], Law No. 181 of 1947, available at
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the Minister of Finance to establish a Japan Banking Policy Committee to
set maximum interest rates that varied by region and type of financial
institution.96
The government followed with the Money Lending Industry Self
Regulation Development Act which established local self regulatory
organizations.97 Membership, however, was voluntary and less than 10% of
the registered money lenders joined.98 In response, the government enacted
in 1949 the Money Lending Industry Control Act.99 This new law required
advance registration by commercial money lenders with the Ministry of
Finance and the submission of business practice reports detailing interest
rates charges.100 If those interest rates rates exceeded 50 sen per day, the
Ministry of Finance routinely rejected the report and, in doing so, attemped
to impose a de facto interest rate cap of 182.5% per annum.101
Interest rates rose rapidly during the period from 1946 through 1949,
from approximately 50% to over 200%.102 They were followed by “the
Dodge Line,” harsh anti-inflationary measures drafted by Joseph Dodge,
economic advisor to Supreme Commander of Allied Powers.103 Deflation
and recession followed, businesses were forced into bankruptcy,
unemployment increased, and workers went on strike protesting layoffs at
Japan Steelworks, Toshiba, and other major companies.104 Letters to the
legal advice columnist of the Yomiuri Newspaper touched repeatedly on
borrowing money.105

http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S22/S22HO181.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Temporary
Interest Rate Adjustment Act].
95
Price Control Order, supra note 94, art. 10.
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Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Act, supra note 94, arts. 2, 3.
97
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Regulation Development Act], Law No. 170 of 1949, http://hourei.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/
frame/haishi_top.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
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ONO, supra note 22, at 222.
99
Kashikingyō Torishimarihō [Money Lending Industry Control Act], Law No. 170 of 1949.
100
ONO, supra note 22, at 222.
101
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 397.
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TAKAFUSA NAKAMURA, A HISTORY OF SHŌWA JAPAN, 1926-1989, 295 (Edwin Whenmouth
trans., 1998).
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Dodge’s economic plan prioritized balancing the budget by stemming the flow of funds from the
government to the private sector, stopping subsidies, and halting lending by the Reconstruction Finance
Bank. Id. at 297.
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See id. at 299.
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Dokusha Hōritsu Sōdan: Kaizanmae no Bira Senjutsu, Kyōsei Rōdou, Kōri no Shakkin ni Nayamu,
YOMIURI SHINBUN, Dec. 8, 1948, at 2; Hōritsu Sōdan: Kōrikashi Kara no Shakkin Kashikin to Kaisha no
Hasan, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Apr. 8, 1950, at 3; Hōritsu Sōdan: Shakkin no Kinri shinhōritsu ni Yoru Katei
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In 1954, the Diet responded with a new Interest Rate Restriction Act
(“IRRA”)106 as well as the Acceptance of Investment, Money Deposits and
Interest Rates Regulation Act (“Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates
Act”).107 Both were aimed at what the newspapers described as “street
finance companies” and “vague moneylenders” that had arisen in the
aftermath of World War II.108 Both laws continue to govern the consumer
finance industry in Japan today.
The latter, as its unwieldy title suggests, sought to regulate three
separate areas of finance. It restricted the acceptance of investments and
money deposits to licensed financial institutions.109 The law offered a direct
response to the upheaval caused by postwar pyramid schemes such as the
“Conservation Economics Club,” which offered a five year, ¥2 million
return on an investment of ¥10,000 and gathered 15,000 investors and ¥450
million before filing for bankruptcy.110
With regard to interest rates, it capped them as well as brokerage
commissions on loans.111 Article 4 capped commissions at 5% of the loan
amount and deemed any money received by a broker “to be a commission
regardless of its designation.”112 The new act added criminal penalties to
lending money at usurious rates. Article 5 provided for imprisonment up to
three years and/or a fine up to ¥3 million for lending rates in excess of 30
sen per day, or 109.5% per year.113
The new IRRA revised the private law restrictions. The Ministry of
Justice explained that, given currency values, continued application of the
Meiji era interest rate and yen range structure would be “remarkably

106
Risoku Seigen Hō [Interest Rate Restriction Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, available at http://law.egov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO100.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter IRRA]. The new law
came into effect June 15, 1954, abolishing and replacing the Meiji IRRA. Id. supp. provision 1-2,
translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 4, at app. 4B-2 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2007).
107
Shusshi no Ukeire, Azukarikin oyobi Kinri nado no Torishimari ni kansuru Hōritsu [Acceptance
of Investments, Money Deposits and Interest Rates Regulation Act], Law No. 195 of 1954 [hereinafter
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act]. The law abolished its predecessor, the Money Lending
Industry Self Regulation Development Act No. 170 of 1949. See Shusshihō available at http://law.egov.go.jp/htmldata/S29/S29HO195.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).
108
Machi no Kinyū Torishimarihō Kokkai he Teishutsu, YOMIURI SHINBUN, Mar. 2, 1954, at 3;
Seiritsu Shita Shuyō Keizai Hōritsu, YOMIURI SHINBUN, June 5, 1954 at 4.
109
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act, supra note 107, arts. 1-2. The Law also prohibited
loans made by employees of financial institutions for the benefit of themselves or a third party other than
the financial institution. Id. art. 3.
110
The “Conservation Economics Club” prompted calls for new regulation and a fraud conviction for
its managers. Kimura Mitsue, Shusshihō to Shōhisha Hogo, 240 HŌGAKU KYŌSHITSU 16 (2000).
111
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act, supra note 107, art. 4
112
Id.
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Id. art. 5.
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irrational” and contribute to a tendency for the law to be ignored.114 The
new IRRA increased the ceilings on the three interest rate caps, and it
explicitly incorporated the exception recognized by the pre-war judiciary
validating “voluntary” payment of interest in excess of the caps.115
Article 1 of the 1954 IRRA capped maximum interest rates where the
principal is less than ¥100,000 at 20% per annum; where the principal is
between ¥100,000 and ¥1 million at 18%; and where the principal is ¥1
million or more at 15%.116 “The agreement on interest shall be null and void
with regard to the portion which is in excess.”117 Pursuant to Paragraph 2,
however, “where the debtor has voluntarily paid a portion in excess . . . he
may not demand the refund thereof.”118 Scholars argued the revisions
should have been limited to adjusting the limits to account for the new
currency values.119
The gap between the top
Gray Zone Lending After 1954
20% civil cap and 109.5%
criminal cap left plenty of
room
for
“voluntary
payments.”120
Consumer
finance
companies,
not
surprisingly, lent money at
rates within this range, in a
practice that came to be
known
as
“gray
zone
lending.”121
The
statute
also
explicitly
addressed
“discounted interest” and
“construed interest.” Discounted interest or prepaid interest “shall be
deemed to have been allocated to the payment of the principal.”122 Money
Interest Rate

109.5%

20%

18%

15%

100,000

114

Yen

1,000,000

Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Section, Explanation of the Interest Rate Restriction Act, quoted
in Nishimura, supra note 31, at 395.
115
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 393.
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117
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Id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
119
Nishimura, supra note 31, at 394.
120
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and Interest Rates Act. The claim was rejected. See 492 HANREI TAIMZU 115 (Fukuoka D. Ct, Dec. 22,
1982).
121
Kinyūchō, Karisugi·Tajū Saimu ni Go Chūi, http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/karisugi/index.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2007); Gure-zon-no Kinri, ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 14, 2006, at 43.
122
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received by the creditor in connection with the loan, other than for principal
or expenses “in concluding the contract” or “performing obligation-duties,”
will be deemed interest regardless of whether construed as an investigation
fee, discount charge, commission, or other.123 Finally, the new statute
restricted the liquidated damages permitted in a loan to no more than two
times the rates prescribed in Article 1.124
The Diet, in effect, incorporated the prewar holdings of the Great
Court of Cassation that defined “discounted interest” and “construed
interest,” as well as the early court doctrine regarding payments “voluntarily
made.” The latter doctrine, now statutory law, continued to significantly
limit the substantive effect of the statute.125
The new Japanese Supreme Court made few changes. In a 1955
decision, it reviewed illegal interest rate charges of 120% and found:
It goes without saying that a creditor cannot demand payment
of contractually designated interest in excess of any interest
rates provided in the [IRRA] in an action at law. However, with
regard to the portion already paid without objection by the
debtor, one cannot make claims for repayment of this amount,
or claim that the apportionment of this payment was
inappropriate.126
The Supreme Court found that such interest rates were not, despite the
IRRA, ipso facto void as against public policy. To find a violation of Article
90 of the Civil Code required “special circumstances” where the lender took
advantage of a borrower who “was in dire straits, rash, or inexperienced in
order to gain strikingly excessive profits.”127
The lower courts were less constrained. While prewar cases focused
on the statutory language “void before the court,” postwar courts quickly
focused on the language “voluntarily paid.” Postwar courts split with regard
to whether payments voluntarily made in excess of the interest-rate caps
should be applied to the remaining principal of the loan. Some courts said
no, including a 1955 Sapporo High Court decision that foreclosed on the

123
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borrower’s ST deluxe men’s bicycle.128 Others said yes, finding that any
interest payments in excess of the caps, voluntary or not, should be applied
to the remaining principal.129 These courts found the payments similar to
prepayment of interest, which pursuant to Article 2 reduced the amount of
principal; they focused on the intent of the statute to “protect the
economically disadvantaged borrower.”130
The Supreme Court followed, slowly. In a May 1962 decision, it
overturned a lower court applying liquidated damages that exceeded the
interest rate caps to the principal of the loan.131 The Court found the
contractual provision void and the voluntary payment made on a “non-debt,”
but it held that the borrower was not permitted to demand application of the
excess payments to the remaining principal of the loan, because this “would
have the same economic effect as receiving a refund.”132 Even if the intent
of the statute was to “protect the economically disadvantaged borrower from
usurious financing rates,” applying excess interest payments to the principal
of the loan in this case would “give rise to a remarkable inequality of
treatment” with those for whom no principal remained.133
In the next two years, ten new members were appointed to the
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court changed its mind.134 In 1964, the
Supreme Court sitting en banc handed down a decision that scholars hailed
as the beginning of a newly assertive Supreme Court.135 The defendant had
borrowed at interest rates up to 36% and argued that the payments made in
excess of the statutory caps should be applied to the principal.136 The
arguments were familiar, and the lower courts declined to do so. The
128
223 HANREI JIHŌ 23, 24 (Sapporo High Ct., Feb. 29, 1955). See also 7 KAKYŪ MINSHŪ 392
(Nagoya High Ct., Feb. 20, 1956); 118 HANREI TAIMUZU 64 (Sendai High Ct., Jan. 26, 1959); 103 HANREI
TAIMUZU 41 (Kōmatsu High Ct., Mar. 10, 1960); 10 KAKYŪ MINSHŪ 173 (Sendai High Ct., Dec. 27, 1960).
129
81 HANREI TAIMUZU 64 (Hiroshima High Ct., Apr. 3, 1958); 94 HANREI TAIMUZU 48 (Nagoya
High Ct., June 13, 1959); 234 HANREI JIHŌ 18 (Tokyo High Ct., July 12, 1960).
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227 HANREI JIHŌ 21, 23 (Tokyo High Ct., May 30, 1960). See also 232 HANREI JIHŌ 27, 28
(Tokyo D. Ct., July 8, 1960).
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Supreme Court acknowledged its earlier decisions, but now found that
“when the borrower has voluntarily paid interest and liquidated damages on
a cash-based consumption loan contract in excess of the restrictions” that
portion should be applied to the remaining principal. The Court found
Article 1 was a mandatory provision and any excess interest rate charges
“void”:
As a result, even where a borrower makes payment designating
it as payment of interest and liquidated damages, with regard to
the excess portion, that designation is without meaning, and, as
a result, it is treated as if there was no designation at all.137
Where unpaid principal remained, now, pursuant to the default provisions of
the Civil Code, excess interest would be applied to that principal.138 Where
earlier courts searched for the parties’ intent, now, that intent “is without
meaning” and “treated as if there was no designation.”139
For the first time, the Supreme Court prioritized consumer protection:
“interpreting the debtor’s voluntary payment of amounts in excess of the
restrictions as payment towards the remaining principal comports with the
primary legislative intent of the law to protect the borrower who occupies an
economically disadvantaged position.”140 Any other interpretation justified
by an inequality of result would “abandon the protection of borrowers with
principal outstanding and violate the legislative spirit of this law.”141
The Court’s concern with unequal treatment of borrowers was shortlived. Four years later, the Supreme Court explicitly allowed claims for
refund.142 Plaintiff had borrowed at an interest rate of 84%, defaulted, and
the defendant foreclosed on property pledged as collateral. The plaintiff
sued for return of the property and a refund of interest and penalties paid.
The lower court refused to award damages, but the Supreme Court reversed:
[W]hen a borrower has voluntarily paid interest or liquidated
damages in excess of the law’s designated interest rates, a
demand for the refund of that excess portion cannot be made.
However, this provision is, as a matter of course, premised on
principal existing on a cash-based consumption loan. Where
137
Id. The courts looked to the statute and, reasoning by analogy, found payment of excess interest
was like prepayment of interest and applied to the principal. Id.
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principal on the loan does not exist, it cannot give rise to
interest or liquidated damages, and, as a result, it is not possible
for there to be an excess payment of interest or liquidated
damages.143
In other words, where the principal had been paid and the borrower
continued to voluntarily pay interest and liquidated damages, the payment is
made on a “non-debt,” the IRRA is not applicable, and “a claim for
repayment based on unjust enrichment will be recognized.”144 Scholars
argued that the Supreme Court had engaged in “judicial legislation”
declaring paragraph 2 of Articles 1 and 4 of the IRRA deadletter.145 They
called the decision “groundbreaking” and a clear attempt at “social ordering”
by the Supreme Court.146
Throughout the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s, the courts
repeatedly upheld borrower’s claims for unjust enrichment and awarded
damages refunding gray zone interest rates charges. In their decisions, the
courts continued to emphasize the inequality between the creditor and
borrower, focus on substance over form, and ignore the parties’ stated
intent.147
A second 1968 Supreme Court decision illustrates their willingness to
ignore the plain language of the contract.148 The parties had entered into
multiple loan contracts and contractually designated the apportionment and
order of payment, but the court found: “with regard to . . . the amount in
excess of the restrictions for which no obligation exists, that agreement is
meaningless.”149 At this point, the Court was willing to flatly ignore the
explicit intent of the parties. It addressed the issue sua sponte, as “a legal
issue,” finding no need to wait for argument or special pleading from the
parties.150
A 1977 Supreme Court decision illustrates their interest in substance
over form.151 The Court found the lender lent ¥11.5 million to a borrower
143
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but required the borrower maintain ¥6 million on deposit. In doing so, the
lender violated Article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Act and
“engaged in an unfair business practice.”152 The Supreme Court found “in
reality” a loan to “the economically vulnerable appellant” of no more than
¥5.5 million and recalculated interest charges based on this, subject to the
restrictions set out in the IRRA.153
With these decisions, the Supreme Court began to enforce a
“legislative intent” to protect the borrower and, in doing so, to ignore the
parties’ stated intent. Along the way, they invalidated the “voluntary
payment” sections of the IRRA.154 According to one practitioner, after 1964,
the Supreme Court came to “prioritize the objective application” of the
Act.155
The decisions did little though to stem growing problems, widely
reported in Japanese newspapers, with the burgeoning consumer finance
industry. With banks focused on secured business loans and uninterested in
unsecured consumer loans, consumer finance companies started cropping up
in the 1950s and increased rapidly in the 1960s. 156 Sara-kin, an abbreviation
for “salaryman financing” or unsecured consumer loans, continued to grow
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s.157 Finance companies introduced
automatic teller machines (“ATM”) to dispense cash loans to registered
users.158 “One call lending” allowed new borrowers to complete loans over
the telephone and have the money transferred to the customer’s bank
account the same day.159 New ATMs followed that could screen new
borrowers allowing them to borrow any time of the day or night, without the

152
Id. According to Article 19 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act, “No
entrepreneur shall engage in unfair business practices.” Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kōsei Torihiki no
Kakuo ni kansuro Hōritsu [Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act], Law No. 23 of 2003, art. 19,
translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. 7, at app. 7A-23 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1999).
153
31 MINSHŪ (No. 4) 449 (Sup. Ct., June 20, 1977), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/search/
jhsp0010?action_id=first&hanreiSrchKbn=02.
154
ONO, supra note 22, at 284.
155
Chihara Yōko, Saikōsaibanrei no Kiseki Seiri, 1106 HANREI TAIMUZU 14, 16 (2002).
156
Terada, supra note 26; Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu he Yoyatō
Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7; Bōryoku Toritate ha Haijo—Tōnai
no Kashikingyōsha, Jishu Kisei Tsukuru, NIKKEI, Apr. 9, 1982, at 23; Kaho Shimizu & Mayumi Negishi,
Aggressive TV Commercials Paid Off—Perhaps Too Much, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 18, 2006.
157
Shōhisha Kinyū Shinyō Kyōyo Zandaka (Shōwa 56–Heisei 14), available at
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/14.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); Zaimukyoku Kankei no Kinyū
Kikan, available at http://www.mof.go.jp/zaimu/50nenn/020402.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
158
Shōhisha Kinyū Kakusha, Madoguchi Kikaika Rasshu—CD·ATM o Shinzōsetsu, Raishun 200 Dai
Taisei, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, Apr. 22, 1982, at 12.
159
Denwa Ippon De Sugu Yūshi—Shinshu no Sarakin Hirogaru Ippō, Ukeru Tegarusa, Higeki mo
Fueru, NIKKEI (Nishibu Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1983, at 17.
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embarrassment or inconvenience of going to a finance company.160
Consumer loans up to ¥300,000 required only an identification card and selfdeclaration of income.161
Along with easy credit came harsh collection tactics.162 In 1976, the
National Police Agency took the unusual step of publicly requesting the
Ministry of Finance investigate and adopt regulatory measures to address the
problems associated with the economic downturn in the 1970s and bad-faith,
high interest lending practices.163 Consumer interest groups formed to
advocate legislative reform.164 Local bar associations formed study
groups,165 and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations proposed
legislation.166 Opposition parties submitted bills in the Diet to regulate the
industry.167
Newspapers, even the conservative Nihon Keizei Shinbun, began
publishing accounts of sara-kin financing destroying families; overwhelmed
borrowers fleeing their homes; borrowers committing suicide; borrowers
killing their children and themselves; housewives arrested for burglarizing
department stores to repay consumer debt; and debtors setting fire to their
homes to collect the insurance and repay consumer loans.168 Of the fiftyfour debt-related suicides recorded in Fukuoka Prefecture in 1982,
160

See Shimizu & Negishi, supra note 156; see also Nakamura & Negishi, supra note 11.
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 16. Unsecured loans are generally offered for individuals in
amounts up to ¥300,000 and for small businesses in amounts up to ¥500,000. The terms of the loan vary,
but are often advertised as ranging from one month to five years, payment by monthly installment. All
contain acceleration clauses and liquidated damages; many require a guarantor. See, e.g., Promise, Shōhin
Naiyō, Kaiin Kiyaku, https://cyber.promise.co.jp/Pcmain;jsessionid=0001Tr8toqbPA6lcTkbVBzT8Q6G:2
(last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Acom, AC Kain Kiyaku, Kashitsuke Jōken Hyō,
http://pr.acom.jp/def/?p1=afvc003 (last visited Apr. 30, 2007); Takefuji, ¥Shop, http://www.takefuji.co.jp/
shop/karitai/ad693_main.html?ad=p000693%83g%83%89%83t%83B%83b%83N%83Q%81%5B%83g
(last visited Apr. 30, 2007).
162
Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu he Yoyatō Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai
Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7; Bōryoku Toritate ha Haijo—Tōnai no Kashikingyōsha, Jishu
Kisei Tsukuru, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1982, at 23.
163
Akushitsu Sarakin, Hōchi Dekinu—Keisatsuchō, Ōkurashō ni Kisei Kyōka Yōsei, NIKKEI
(Chōkan), Dec. 22, 1976, at 19.
164
Shōhisha Kinyū Kyōkai, Sarakin Riyōsha Hogo ni Kujōshorii nado Setchi, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN),
Dec. 29, 1976, at 8.
165
Ōsaka Bengoshikai, Sarakin Mondai o Kenkyū—Hōsei no Shian Tsukuri he, NIHON KEIZAI
SANGYŌ SHINBUN, July 28, 1977, at 9.
166
Sarakin, Nichibenren ga Kiseian—Menkyōsei Dōnyū ya Rishi Seigen, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), Aug. 3,
1978, at 22.
167
“Sarakin” Hōkisei no Ugoki - Eigyō Teishi nado Gyōsei Kainyū, Kōmeitō, Konkokkai ni
Hōanteishutsu, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), May 7, 1977, at 6.
168
Kokumin Seikatsu Shinbukai, Sarakin Kisei de Chūkan Hōkoku—Shōhisha Shinyō Hogohō o,
Kōkinri nado Hadome, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Sept. 9, 1978, at 22; Keishichō, Nenmatsu Hikae Akushitsu Kinyū
34 Gyōsha Tekihatsu, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 27, 1981, at 15; Okūsan, Otonari Made Sarakin Higeki ga –
Kigaruni Karishimi ni, NIKKEI (Nagoya Chōkan), Apr. 4, 1983, at 21; Sarakingyōhō no Settei o Isoge,
NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 9, 1983, at 2.
161
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approximately 80% were attributed to problems with sara-kin.169 The police
made mass arrests of lenders violating the law and pointed to links to
organized crime.170 The stories of “debtor’s hell” and “salaryman finance
tragedies” mounted and so did the pressure on the Japanese government to
act.
In 1978, as discussions between the ministries over a regulatory
framework dragged on, the Ministry of Finance worked on a bill that would
cut the then current public law caps of 109.5%.171
They issued
administrative guidance to the Japanese Federation of Consumer Finance
Associations to clarify interest disclosures and begin providing detailed
receipts.172 The Prime Minister followed, directing the administrative
agencies to submit to the next session of Diet a comprehensive legislative
proposal. 173 In two months, the Ministry of Finance had draft legislation
that created a licensing system for lenders, reduced maximum interest rates,
and added administrative oversight.174
The bill was never submitted to the Diet.175 LDP proposals barred
borrower claims for refund of interest charges in excess of the IRRA caps
where “the borrower paid the interest voluntarily,” an addition reversing the
Supreme Court and strongly opposed by the opposition parties.176 The
LDP’s legislation “miscarried” in 1979, and again in 1980, 1981, and
1982.177 Over the course of eight sessions of parliament, bills were
169
Sarakin Higeki, Yūkōgata kara Seikatsugata he—Kyūshū Kakuchi de Kensū Kyūzō, Hōritsu Sōdan
3 Wari, NIKKEI (Nishibu Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 17.
170
Keishichō, Akushitsu Sarakin 25 sha Tekihatsu—Mise no Shina Katte ni Shobun no Rei mo,
NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 25, 1978, at 11; Keishichō, Nenmatsu Hikae Akushitsu Kinyū 34 Gyōsha Tekihatsu,
NIKKEI (Yūkan), Nov. 27, 1981, at 15; Tōkyō·Himonyasho, Geppu Hanbaiten Kara 2 Okuen Sashu no
Shufu Guru-pu o Taihō—Sarakin no Hensai ni Komari, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Feb. 24, 1982, at 15.
171
Ōkurashō, Sarakin Kisei he Hōritsu Kaisei o Kentou—Kinri no Jōgen wo Hanbun ni?, NIKKEI
(CHŌKAN), Aug. 22, 1978, at 1.
172
Ōkurashō, Sarakin o Kyōroku ni Gyōsei Shidō—Nenritate Demo Hyōji, Kōrikisei to 2 Dan
Kamae, NIKKEI (CHŌKAN), Aug. 23, 1978, at 3.
173
Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Jiki Kokkai Seiritsu Hakare—Shushō Shiji, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Oct. 20, 1978, at
1; Ōkurashō, Sarakin Kisei he Shusshi Hō Kaisei no Genan—Tōrokusei · 3 Nen Kōshin, NIKKEI (Chōkan),
Dec. 12, 1978, at 3.
174
Id.
175
Seifu, Sarakin Kisei no Kashikingyou Kise Hōan no Kokkai Teishutsu Dannen, Giin Rippou Machi
he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Mar. 13, 1979, at 9.
176
Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Ōtsume de Nankō—Jiminan ni Yatō Ni no Ashi, Chōka Kinri no Atsukai ga
Shōten ni, NIKKEI (Chōkan), May 10, 1979, at 3; Sarakin Kisei Hō, Yoyatō no Iken Chōsei Nakō—Gure-zon ga Sōten, Saishū Ketsuron ha Raishu Ikōka, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 10, 1979, at 10.
177
Sarakin Kisei Hōan, Jimintō Tandoku Demo Kokkai Teishutsu he—Zaisei Bukai de Hōshin
Katameru, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 17, 1979, at 10; Kashikingyō Kisei Hōan, Keizoku
Shinsa ha Hisshi—Yoyatō ‘Gure-zo-n” de Tairitsu, NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, June 11, 1979, at 9;
Jimin, Sarakin Kisei Hōan Saiteishutsu o Kimeru, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Mar. 15, 1980, at 4; Kashikingyō
Hōan no Kaitei Machikoshi he—Kinri Kisei Nuki no Hōan Shingi, Ōkura no ‘Matta” de Tekkai, NIHON
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introduced and either defeated or withdrawn for further review.178
Opposition parties also objected to LDP proposals that would reduce
maximum interest rates to 54.75% rather than 36.5%.179 Small and medium
lenders, then lending at 70% to 80%, opposed any reduction and “possessed
vote getting power that the LDP could not ignore.”180
The LDP then proposed to reduce interest rates over time, lowering
the maximum interest rate to 40.0004% “at a future date” and keeping the
“voluntary payment” provisions. 181 They admitted the law would overturn
Supreme Court precedent but argued that it balanced the need for borrower
protection with the need to improve an unstable business environment for
lenders.182 Opposition parties and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations
argued the proposal was a sop to industry, would increase problems, and turn
the IRRA into a “shell.”183 After six years of debate, the LDP gathered
enough support for the proposed regulatory structure to overcome opposition
to the interest rate provisions. The bill passed, as proposed, in 1983.184
With this, the Diet revised the Investments, Deposits, and Interest
Rates Act and enacted the third and final piece of legislation that regulates
the consumer finance industry today, the Money Lending Industry
Regulation Act.185 The Diet revised the former by amending Article 5 to
reduce the interest-rate levels at which criminal penalties would attach “in
instances where moneylending is conducted as a business.”186 The
maximum interest rates would be reduced in stages, from 109.5% to 73% in
KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, Nov. 11, 1981, at 9; Bōri Sarakin Yurusanu, Kisei Hōan Konkokkai ni Teishutsu
He Yoyatō Gōi—Jōgen Kinri Dankai Sage, NIKKEI (Yūkan), Mar. 20, 1982, at 7.
178
Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu Kankin, Akushitsugyōsha Haijo ni Kōka—“Kinri” no Kaizen Mada
Mada, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 7.
179
Sarakin no “Tsuke” Itsumade—Kisei Hōan, Mata mo Ryūzan?, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 15, 1982,
at 3.
180
Id.
181
“Myōyomi” no Kashikingyō Kiseihō—Jōgen Nenri 40.004%, Ōkura ha Seiritsu ni Muke-Maru,
NIHON KEIZAI SANGYŌ SHINBUN, May 11, 1982, at 12.
182
Id. (“This law is momentous as it seeks to overturn Supreme Court precedent setting out a right of
demand return of interest. It will improve the unstable business conditions facing lenders, and at the same
time protect borrowers. It must be passed this session of the Diet.”).
183
Nichibenren, Sarakin Kisei Hōan de Jimintō·Shakai ni Ikensho—Higaisha Fuyasu Osore, NIKKEI
(Chōkan), July 23, 1982, at 3; Nichibenren nado, Sarakin Hōan Hihan, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 20, 1983, at
31 (A law like this is likely to enlarge the usury pot (nabe), and is clearly tilted towards protecting the
interests of industry.”).
184
Kashikingyō no Kisei nado ni Kansuru Hōritsu [The Money Lending Industry Regulation Act],
Law No. 32 of 1983, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S58/S58HO032.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2007) [hereinafter Money Lending Industry Regulation Act], translated in [STATUTE VOL.] DOING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 152, pt. 7, app. 7C; Sarakin Kisei Hōan Sanin de Kaketsu, Shūin he, NIKKEI
(Yūkan), Apr. 20, 1983, at 1.
185
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184.
186
Id. art. 5, ¶ 2.
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three years, to 54.75% in five years, and to 40.004% at an undetermined
future date.187 Supplementary rules carved out exceptions for “daily
installment lenders,” who “for the time being” could continue to lend at rates
up to 109.5%.188 By this point the largest consumer finance companies were
lending at rates below 50% and were largely unaffected.189
These revisions were limited in comparison to the newly enacted
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act.
The 1983 law imposed
comprehensive regulation on the industry.190 Article 3 required money
lenders operating in one jurisdiction to register with the governor’s office
and those operating in multiple jurisdictions to register with the Ministry of
Finance.191 Registration could be refused based on a finding of previous
violations of the laws regulating the money lending industry.192
Unregistered money lenders were prohibited from operating, and registered
187
Sarakin Kiseihō no Seiritsu, Akushitsugyōsha Tsuihō he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 29, 1983, at 11;
ONO, supra note 22, at 236.
188
Supplementary Rule Nos. 8-10 addressed “daily installment lenders” (nippu kashikingyōsha)
lending to designated small-scale industries engaged in the production and sale of goods. Repayment
periods were required to be over 100 days in length, with the lender collecting in person at the debtor’s
home or place of business. The intent was to facilitate loans to small business by allowing payments from
daily sales receipts, with the higher collection costs justifying the higher rates. Lenders were required to
make collection rounds on over 70% of the payment days in order to qualify for the higher interest rate.
See ONO, supra note 22, at 238-40; Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). Lenders would advertise “one
phone call/immediate lending” and “borrow ¥100,000 and pay only ¥1000 a day.” Hikake Kinyū, Jōken
Kibishiku: Saikōsai Handan Akushitsu Kōri Haijo ni Michibiku, ASASHI SHINBUN, Jan. 25, 2006, at 2.
Supplementary Rule Nos. 14 & 15 provided additional exceptions for pawn brokers and “telephone
subscription loans.” NTT traditionally charged a substantial subscription fee for the installation of
telephone service, and “telephone subscription loans” were secured by that subscription. The principal
amount of the loan could not exceed an amount specified by ordinance and tied to the cost of purchasing
the subscription and installing the line. See ONO, supra note 22, at 238-40.
189
Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu he—Akushitsugyōsha ha Eigyō Teishi, Sarakin Nabe Bōshi niha Genkai,
NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 27, 1983, at 5.
190
Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu Kankin, Akushitsugyōsha Haijo ni Kōka—“Kinri” no Kaizen Mada
Mada, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 16, 1983, at 7. According to Article 1, “[t]he purpose of this Act is to
establish a registration system for those engaged in the business of lending money, to set forth necessary
restrictions on such businesses . . . and to protect interest of those in need of loans.” Money Lending
Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 1.
191
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 3. Registration requires detailing:
1) the trade name, designation, and address; 2) for legal entities, the names and addresses of officers; 3) for
designated employees, the names and addresses of such employees; 4) for minors, the name and address of
the legal representative; 5) the names and locations of the places of business or offices; 6) the types and
methods of business; and 7) if other businesses are performed, the types of such businesses. Id. Subsequent
amendments added requirements for the listing of a designated principal at each office and contact
information, including the office phone number, for any offices or places of business to be listed in
advertisements or loans solicitations. Id. art. 4. The 2003 amendments required confirmation of the
applicant’s identity, additional capital requirements and prohibitions on affiliation with organized crime.
Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite, http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
192
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 6, ¶ 5.
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money lenders prohibited from operating at undisclosed places of
business.193 Unregistered lenders were now subject to criminal penalties of
up to three years imprisonment or a fine of up to ¥3 million.194
The Money Lending Industry Regulation Act also required
investigation of the borrower’s credit worthiness and prohibited loan
contracts likely to exceed his or her ability to repay the loan, but assigned no
penalty for violation.195 The Act prohibited collection practices that
amounted to coercion (ihaku) or which “disturbed the peace of private life or
work,”196 and for these violations imposed criminal penalities of up to six
months imprisonment or a fine up to ¥1 million.197
It also detailed new documentation requirements. Lenders were
required to disclose at their place of business information regarding interest
rates, the method and period of payment, number of installments, and other
information designated by ordinance.198 The Act required advertisements to
include the interest rate and other information designated by ordinance, and
also prohibited any representation considered false or misleading.199
Pursuant to Article 17, lenders concluding a loan contract must
“without delay” provide the borrower with written documentation clearly
disclosing the terms of the loan contract.200 Pursuant to Article 18, when the
borrower makes a payment, the lender “must promptly provide to the
borrower receipt documents for each payment.” 201 The Act gave the Prime
193

Id. art. 11, ¶¶ 1, 3.
Id. art. 47, ¶ 2.
195
Id. arts. 13, 36; Sarakin Kiseihō no Seiritsu, Akushitsugyousha Tsuihō he, NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr.
29, 1983, at 11.
196
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 21. Subsequent revisions gave
specific examples including collection, absent justifiable reason, between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m.,
telephone or visits to the borrower’s place of work, and also prohibited the use of or sale of debt to
members of organized crime.
See Kinyūchō, Kashikingyōsha Kankei no Hōrei ni Tsuite,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/ordinary/chuui/hourei.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
197
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 48.
198
Id. art. 14.
199
Id. arts. 15, 16.
200
Id. art. 17. The loan contracts must include: 1) the tradename, designation, and address of the
moneylender; 2) the date of execution of the contract; 3) the amount of the loan; 4) the interest rate on the
loan; 5) the method of repayment; 6) the period for repayment and number of installments; 7) where there
is a liquidated damages provision, the amount thereof; and 8) other items as designated by Ministry of
Finance Ordinance. Id. art. 17 ¶ 1, items 1-8.
201
Id. art. 18. These receipt documents must contain: 1) the tradename, designation name, and
address of the moneylender; 2) the date of execution of contract; 3) the amount of the loan; 4) the amount
received and its apportionment to interest, principal or damages; 5) the date of receipt of payment; and 6)
any other items designated by the Ministry of Finance. Id. art. 18 ¶ 1, items 1-6. Additional disclosures
are required by ordinance including: 1) words indicating receipt of payment; 2) the moneylender’s
registration number; 3) the borrower's name, commercial name, and registration number if any; 4) if a third
party other than the borrower or guarantor made payment, that person's name, trade name, and/or
registration number if any; and 5) the remaining amount of the loan after payment. Enforcement
194
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Minister and prefectural governors power to suspend a registered lender’s
business for up to one year where the lender violates the disclosure and
collection provisions and to cancel the lender’s registration where the
circumstances are either particularly grave or a suspension order is
violated.202
At the same time, Article 43 rolled back the judicially developed
norms of the 1960s.203 Prior to the 1983 legislation, approximately 30,000
borrowers a year restructured or eliminated debt pursuant to the standards
established by the Supreme Court.204 Article 43 now provided that where
the borrower “voluntarily paid interest” in excess of the maximum interest
rates and the borrower received the necessary documentation, that payment
would be “deemed a valid payment of interest on the debt.”205 The
articulated rationale was that moneylenders as registered entities were now
subject to strict regulation, and Article 43 was intended to protect and
encourage “good-faith lenders” by allowing them to charge higher interest
rates.206 Proponents also argued that if debtors were able to demand a refund
of excess interest rate payments, transactions would lose their certainty, and
it would lead to an increase in black-market moneylending.207
The provision was enormously unpopular within the scholarly
community and the Japanese bar; they had opposed it from the start, without
effect.208 In contrast, the judiciary opposed this change to great effect.
There were no sweeping pronouncements, but there was a slow, incremental
restriction of the Article’s application.
Early on, lower courts held that Article 43 of the Money Lending
Industry Regulation Act voids the intent of the IRRA and “is applicable only
where the conditions imposed are strictly met.”209 Those conditions
included the lender proving 1) it acted as a registered moneylender “engaged
in the business”; 2) the borrower paid the money “voluntarily as interest”;
and 3) the lender provided all of the proper documents.210
Regulations for the Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, as revised by Cabinet Order 39, Apr. 11,
2006, art. 15, ¶ 1, items 1-5.
202
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, arts. 36-37.
203
Ono, supra note 135.
204
Sarakin Kiseihō Seiritsu he—Akushitsugyōsha ha Eigyō Teishi, Sarakin Nabe Bōshi niha Genkai,
NIKKEI (Chōkan), Apr. 27, 1983, at 5.
205
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 43 ¶ 1. The same prescription
applies to liquidated damages. Id. art. 43 ¶ 3.
206
ONO, supra note 22, at 240-41.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 327-28.
209
168 MINSAI SHIRYŌ 48 (Kōmatsu Summary Ct., Sept. 27, 1985).
210
1327 KINYŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 29, 33 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 11, 1991); ONO, supra note 22, at 328.
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With regard to money paid “voluntarily as interest,” by 1985 summary
courts were refusing to apply Article 43 where the lender failed to prove the
borrower’s “expression of intent to designate the payment as an interest
payment.”211 Courts apportioned the money paid by the debtor to the
principal, damages, and interest within the caps.212 Later district courts held
that “it is appropriate to require active intent” by the borrower to designate
the payment voluntarily made as interest or damages in order to make an
otherwise invalid debt valid.213
The courts also focused on the documentation requirements.214 Where
the lender failed to disclose all the items required in Article 17 when the loan
was consummated, or where the documents contained mistakes or
omissions, however slight, the courts refused to apply Article 43. A 1988
Kyoto court rejected an Article 43 claim by a lender charging interest rates
of 73%.215 The court held that “all items” must be properly disclosed for
Article 43 to apply and that did not happen where one loan contract
disclosed the interest per day rather than per annum and a second failed to
disclose the lender’s registration number.216
Other courts rejected
application of Article 43 where the umbrella loan document miscalculated
the minimum payment necessary to repay a ¥200,000 loan over a two-year
time period.217 Other courts refused to apply Article 43 where the lender
receipts incorrectly identified certain charges as “handling fees” instead of
interest.218
Lower courts applied the Article 18 documentation requirements with
the same vigor.219 Article 18 requires that the lender provide the borrower
with a receipt containing certain disclosures “promptly” on receipt of each
payment.220 Paragraph 2 provides an exception: where payment is made by
electronic transfer, the receipt is required “only upon request of the person
making the payment.”221 The courts, however, routinely held that even with
electronic payment and regardless of demand by the borrower, where the
211

168 MINSAI SHIRYŌ 48, 51 (Kōmatsu Summary Ct., Sept. 27, 1985).
Id.
213
1327 KINPŌ 29, 33 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 11, 1991). See also 897 HANREI TAIMUZU 213 (Nagoya
D. Ct., May 30, 1995).
214
ONO, supra note 22, at 335.
215
1318 HANREI JIHŌ 106, 108-09 (Kyoto D. Ct., Aug. 19, 1988).
216
Id.
217
1290 HANREI JIHŌ 131, 136-37 (Akita D. Ct., Mar. 14, 1988).
218
1250 HANREI JIHŌ 70, 73 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 3, 1986).
219
ONO, supra note 22, at 360.
220
Money Lending Industry Regulation Act, supra note 184, art. 18. See supra note 201 listing the
required disclosures.
221
Id. ¶ 2.
212

556

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 3

lender did not promptly provide a receipt containing all of the required
disclosures after each payment, they would not apply Article 43.222 Courts
summarily rejected Article 43 claims where the lender did not offer proof
they supplied the Article 18 documents.223 Courts demanded proof sua
sponte when the borrower failed to appear in court.224 The courts found the
Article 18 documentation requirements to be part of a process justifying the
“voluntary payment” of an otherwise invalid debt.225
The first appellate decision addressing Article 18 requirements
rejected arguments that the borrower had contractually agreed to accept an
electronic bank transfer receipt in lieu of the Article 18 receipts.226
According to the Osaka High Court, it is only when the “lender strictly
complies with the procedures” set out in Article 17 and Article 18 that they
are entitled as a “special privilege” to charge otherwise invalid interest
rates.227 “It is possible for the commercial lender, at the time of the loan, to
use its superior position to force agreement to the substitution of simpler
documentation.”228 To allow this would defeat the purpose of the statute: to
provide both evidence of payment in the event of a subsequent dispute and
also “cause the borrower to clearly understand the costs associated with the
debt and apportionment of the repayment.”229
When Article 18 documents were provided, substantial compliance
was not enough. From “the standpoint of consumer protection,” all of the
disclosures specified by law were required.230 Descriptions in the receipt of
payments apportioned to “money advanced” were not specific enough.231
Article 18 receipts omitting the lender’s address and registration number
precluded Article 43 application.232

222
1152 HANREI JIHŌ 158, 159 (Kyoto Summary Ct., Aug. 8, 1984); 1187 HANREI JIHŌ 121, 123
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Article 43. See 652 HANREI TAIMZU 246, 249-50 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 26, 1986).
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The courts also focused on the “voluntariness” of the payments.
When a loan contract required discounted interest payments, a Tokyo
District Court found:
[U]nder circumstances where absent prepayment of interest
financing will not be received, payment by the debtor cannot be
said to be voluntary. . . . As a result, even if prepayment of
interest is done by agreement, it is appropriate to find that it is
not subject to application of Article 43.233
The court ignored the parties’ agreement, found the prepayment terms
imposed, and found no “voluntary” repayment as a result.
An Osaka District Court examined the Article 43 requirements and
found all the requirements met, save one.234 The court refused to apply
Article 43 holding:
In order for the condition of voluntariness to be met, it is
reasonable to interpret that the borrower must be aware that the
interest and penalty payments they are making exceeded the
restrictions set out in the [IRRA], and while aware of that
voluntarily make payment. 235
The court required proof of the borrower’s subjective knowledge of the
IRRA restrictions and, absent that, found no “voluntary” payment. 236
The Osaka High Court pulled back from these aggressive attempts to
protect borrowers and reversed.237 In 1990, the Supreme Court affirmed its
decision.238 The Supreme Court found the purpose of the moneylending
industry law was to secure the appropriate functioning of the industry, and to
“protect the interests of the suppliers of capital.”239 Where the contract
documentation and receipt documentation complied with the intent of the
law, that was sufficient: “[I]t is not required that the borrower understand
that the amount paid exceeded the interest or anticipatory damages
limitations set out in [the IRRA] or that the contract, as to the portion in
233

748 HANREI TAIMZU 170 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1990).
854 KINHAN 12 (Osaka D. Ct., Feb. 27, 1987). The defendant was a moneylender, registered with
the Osaka city government, engaged in the business of making consumer loans. The payments made by the
plaintiff were made pursuant to the contract. At both the time of the loan and at each payment, defendant
provided the plaintiff borrower with the proper loan documentation. Id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
854 KINHAN 10 (Osaka High Ct., Sept. 18, 1987).
238
44 MINSHŪ 332 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 22, 1990), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/
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239
Id.
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excess, was void.”240 The Court found that if the plaintiff made the payment
with the understanding it would be applied to interest and penalties, this
payment was made “of their own free will,” and this was sufficient to apply
Article 43 to validate gray zone lending.241
The Supreme Court endorsed a flexible interpretation of the Article 43
requirements, and was roundly criticized by the bar and by legal scholars.242
It was the Court’s last such decision. Shortly thereafter, in 1991, Japan’s
economic bubble collapsed. The stock and real estate markets collapsed,
and, while that proved a disaster for the banks, it was a “boon for consumer
finance.”243 Those who could no longer obtain bank loans after the value of
their landholdings and other collateral fell turned to the finance companies
and, thereafter, the courts.244
Despite the 1990 Supreme Court decision, the lower courts continued
to restrictively interpret the lending laws.245 A Tokyo District Court again
found that regardless of agreement by the parties, where it was plain that
absent prepayment of interest refinancing would not occur, “it cannot be said
that payment was voluntary.”246 Later high courts agreed.247 Other courts
examining discounted interest found that the law contemplated “the actual
payment of cash,” and where “the defendant did not receive tender of cash
payment for interest, they would not receive application of Article 43.”248
The courts continued to focus on documentation. A Nagoya District
Court found that, despite mistakes, the documents “if read carefully were
sufficient for the average person to understand the terms of the contract” and
sufficient to apply Article 43.249 The Nagoya Appellate Court disagreed,
finding that “the contract documents must be sufficiently comprehensive,
clear and concrete to allow the borrower to correctly understand the nature
of the debt and be able to reference the documentation in formulating a

240
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Id. Earlier decisions found payments made by the borrower with full knowledge that they were in
excess of the amount required under the IRRA not voluntary where they were made to stop harsh collection
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(Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 21, 1997); 1657 HANREI JIHŌ 102 (Fukuoka D. Ct., Feb. 26, 1998).
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repayment plan.”250 In that case, the document was difficult to understand,
and the defendant was “a large-scale money lender with a nationwide
business operation, and the development of documents setting forth the
disclosure contents outlined above . . . cannot be thought of as overly
difficult.”251
The lower courts after the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision adopted “a
strict posture” holding that the items enumerated in Article 17 must be
included in toto for Article 43 to apply.252 Some held that the disclosures
must be contained on one sheet of paper, and where they were not, refused to
apply Article 43.253 An appellate court held that “where it is made clear”
that the Article 17 disclosures are supplemented in a separate document, “as
an exception,” that will satisfy Article 17.254 However, the court still refused
to apply Article 43 because, in that case, it was not made clear enough.255
Where a lender offered revolving credit, both the umbrella contract and
subsequent loan documents taken together must satisfy all the requirements
of Article 17.256 According to some courts, the statutorily required
disclosure of “the amount of the loan” required a detailed accounting of the
principal, interest and damages from any outstanding loans.257
Some courts found that, regardless of documentation, repayment made
by the borrower via ATM or electronic bank transfer could not be
“voluntary.”258 While the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary for
the borrower to understand that they were paying excess interest charges,
lower courts could still hold that a borrower must be able to understand what
portion of the payment would be applied to interest and penalties.259 Courts
held payments made in person would allow the borrower, if dissatisfied with
the apportionment of the payment to interest and penalties, to promptly
complain and refuse or withdraw payment. “In contrast, payment when
made by standard methods using an ATM, does not allow the user to know
beforehand the amount of money that will be allotted to interest and

250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id. at 106.
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1052 KINHAN 49, 52 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 1, 1998).
Id.
1128 KINHAN 41, 44 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 25, 2001).
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1463 HANREI JIHŌ 144, 148 (Fukuyama D. Ct., Oct. 10, 1992).
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1624 HANREI JIHŌ 116 (Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 21, 1997).
Id. at 121.
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damages pursuant to the contract.”260 As a result “it cannot be recognized as
voluntary payment of interest.”261
In 1999, the Supreme Court examined Article 18.262 It acknowledged
that when a borrower voluntarily pays interest in excess of the statutory
caps, that excess may be deemed repayment of valid interest-rate charges
pursuant to Article 43:
However, even when this payment is [electronically deposited]
to a lender’s account or savings account, absent special
circumstances, it is reasonable to find that the lender on
confirmation of receipt of this payment must immediately
provide to the borrower, each time, a document as prescribed in
Article 18 paragraph 1.263
In other words, the Supreme Court required lenders provide detailed receipts
for each payment made by ATM or it would not recognize gray zone interest
rates. Commentators argued that with this decision the Supreme Court
affirmed the strict interpretation seen in the lower courts.264
This decision came as finance companies again assumed the spotlight.
As banks stopped lending to businesses in the early 1990s, the finance
companies continued, with some specializing in business or shōkō loans.
Ninety-nine out of 100 companies in Japan are small or medium sized
businesses,265 and by 1999 they were collectively borrowing ¥14 trillion
from non-bank sources.266 Of that, ¥8 trillion came from finance companies,
including the two largest business loan companies, Nichiei Co. and Shōkoh
Fund.267 Both loan companies were favorites of foreign investors. Japan
funds had begun targeting Shōkoh Fund with its average growth rate of 39%
per year.268 Nichiei Co. was 30% owned by foreign investors and had listed
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.269
Nichiei Co. had also engaged in unsavory collection tactics. Business
loans were offered without collateral for amounts up to ¥10 million, but they
260
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required a guarantor.270 In October 1999, one such guarantor filed suit
against Nichiei Co. alleging, inter alia, that its loan collectors had demanded
the guarantor sell an eyeball or kidney to raise money to repay the loan.271 A
few weeks later, the Metropolitan Police Department arrested the former
employee,272 and the Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) started an
investigation into shōkō lending practices.273
There was little tolerance for such tactics. While Nichiei Co. and
Shōkoh Fund were growing by leaps and bounds in the late 1990s, the rest of
the economy was undergoing “shock therapy” with record bankruptcies,
record unemployment, and continuous restructuring announcements. 274 The
FSA sanctioned Nichiei Co.,275 and the Diet enacted new legislation.276
The drafters acknowledged the December 1999 legislation was
rushed, left issues unresolved, and they provided for re-evaluation of the
legislation three years hence.277 In the interim, the LDP and its coalition
partners enacted mandatory disclosure requirements for loan guarantors and
mandatory notices to guarantors when providing additional financing.278
They added new regulations regarding collection practices vis-à-vis loan
guarantors and increased the penalty provisions.279 Revisions to the
Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act reduced the interest rates at
which criminal penalties would attach from 40.004% to the current 29.2%,
and the IRRA was revised to lower the limits on liquidated damages to 1.46
270
See Suzuki Masanori, Kashikingyō no Kisei nado ni Kansuru Hōritsu no Ichibu o Kaisei Suru,
1571 KINYŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 32 (2000); Cracking Down on Loan Sharks, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999.
271
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273
FRC Unit to Probe ‘shoko’ Lenders, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999.
274
Kinyūchō, Kashikingyō Seido nado ni Kansuru Kondankai no Kaisai ni Tsuite, Tōkei Shiryō nado,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2007); Bill Spindle,
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at 32.
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times the maximum IRRA rates.280 The new legislation reduced the gap and
gray zone lending but did not eliminate it.
Gray Zone Lending Post 2000
In 2003, just as the
lending laws were to be reevaluated, consumer finance
again found its way into the
limelight. On June 14, 2003,
a sixty-one year old cleaning
company worker, his wife,
and her eighty-one year old
brother jumped in front of a
Japan Railways train.281 Their
suicide note detailed their
debts and described how debt
collectors had called the house
every night and threatened to
“get
it
from
their
neighbors.”282 They had decided to “apologize with [their] lives.”283
The suicide note again focused media attention on the finance
companies, particularly the black market lenders. While most “legal”
money lenders are registered, comply to a lesser or greater degree with the
regulations and lend in the gray zone, black-market money lenders either
operate without registration or register and operate outside the established
regulatory framework.284 Commentators estimated the victims of blackmarket or illegal lending practices numbered anywhere from 120,000 to over
1 million people.285 Statistics maintained by the National Police Agency,
showed that organized crime was heavily involved in black-market
lending.286
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Arrests of Organized Crime Members Violating Public Lending Laws287
Year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
46/23 56/33 56/38 41/22 64/20 52/23 130/63
Arrests for violation
of the Money
Lending Industry
Regulation
Act/Organized crime
members arrested
57/19 60/25 80/17 57/26 76/31 68/25 258/77
Arrests for violation
of the Investment,
Deposit and Interest
Rate Restriction Act/
Organized crime
members arrested
In 2003, the police arrested Susumu Kajiyama, the “king of the blackmarket lenders” and a couple of his twenty-one “presidents.”288 Together,
they oversaw a black-market lending operation run by the Yamaguchi crime
family that included approximately 1000 offices and brought in profits of
¥10 billion annually.289 The investigation showed that consumer finance had
become a principle source of funding for organized crime in Japan.290 It also
showed that Kajiyama had organized black-market lending operations as
part of an intentional strategy during the economic stagnation of the 1990s to
move from traditional sources of funds to income sources that targeted the
general public.291 During this time, black-market lenders began direct-mail
advertising to large numbers of distressed borrowers and those that had filed
for bankruptcy.292 Police investigations showed employees soliciting loans
with interest rates over a thousand times the legal rate and working in offices
constructed from karaoke boxes in order to muffle the sounds of their
287
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King’ Plea Held Till Mob Probe Ends, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003.
289
Yami Kinyū Jiken, supra note 288, at 31; Negishi, supra note 288. See also 'King of Sharking' On
Wanted List, supra note 288.
290
Yami Kinyū Jiken, supra note 288, at 31.
291
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 18-19; Karirugawa ga Seikatsu Dekiru Kinri Made Hikisage o,
supra note 271. For a discussion of traditional sources of funds for organized crime in Japan, see Curtis J.
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collection calls.293 Lenders would go to the debtors’ homes, threaten to
reveal their debts to their neighbors, and, absent payment, drive around the
debtor’s house broadcasting the debt over a megaphone. 294
A little over a month following the Osaka suicides the Diet revised the
consumer lending laws.295 In July 2003, the Diet passed the Black Market
Finance Countermeasures Act296 to address the problems associated with
unregistered money lenders and illegal collection practices.297 The Act
raised the criminal penalties for unregistered lenders to a maximum of five
years imprisonment and ¥10 million in fines.298 Japanese courts suspend
most sentences under three years, so this meant that actual time would now
be served.299
The Act increased the registration requirements and precluded
registration by those associated with organized crime.300 It increased basic
capital requirements for registration to ¥30 million for individuals.301 It
prohibited advertising or loan solicitation by unregistered lenders, applied
the collection provisions to unregistered lenders, and raised the fines
associated with unregistered lending and illegal collection practices.302 The
Act also banned advertisements listing only cell phone numbers, misleading
advertisements, and solicitions aimed at borrowers without an ability to
repay.303
The new law set out examples of prohibited collection practices
designed to coerce or oppress the borrower including collection during the
hours from 9 p.m. to 8 a.m. “without a justifiable reason,” and telephone
calls or visits to the borrower’s work place or other places apart from the
home. The legislation prohibited demands for repayment from third parties
other than a guarantor without express permission from the borrower. 304 It
293
294
295
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prohibited demands for pension documents and other “inappropriate means”
of loan maintenance and collection.305 The legislation prohibited the
employment or assistance of any person associated with organized crime or
assignment of debt to the same, and it required for the first time the
placement of a trained compliance officer at each place of business. 306
The law provided that where a lender “engaged in the business of
lending” loaned money at an interest rate in excess of 109.5%, that loan
contract was invalid, in toto, and the borrower need not pay any interest
whatsoever.307 Criminal penalties for loans made in excess of the designated
interest rates were raised to a maximum of five years imprisonment and ¥10
million in fines.308
The Supreme Court followed in 2003 with a trilogy of decisions that
reduced the fees that finance companies could charge. Each decision found
that loan guarantee fees paid by the borrower to a loan guaranty company
wholly-owned by the lender would be construed as interest received by the
lender, and subject to the rate restrictions in the IRRA.309 Each decision
found that where a borrower voluntarily pays interest on one loan in excess
of the IRRA caps, that excess, after paying off the principal of the loan, will
be applied as payment on other outstanding loans, and the lender “cannot
obtain interest during the contractually designated period on this
principal.”310
The Supreme Court handed down three decisions in 2004 involving
financing companies’ small business or shōkō loans. In each case, the
Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions finding for the lender. In a
February 2004 decision, the Supreme Court agreed with those lower courts
that had found that Article 43 had no application where the interest payments
had been discounted by the lender.311 The court also found the requirements
of Article 43 “should be strictly interpreted” and that “all of the items”
designated in Article 17 must be included in the loan documents. Where any
item was missing, including in this case a description of the collateral,
305
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Article 43 would not apply. Article 18 receipt documents must be provided
“immediately after payment,” and, in this case, where the receipts were sent
twenty days after payment, Article 43 would not apply.312 A second decision
in February 2004 found that the lenders sending Article 18 receipt
documents and the bank’s electronic payment forms prior to the payment
date would not satisfy Article 43.313 In July 2004, the Supreme Court ruled
that mailing the Article 18 documents within seven to ten days was
insufficient.314
In 2005, the Supreme Court resolved a split among the lower courts
finding that while there was no statutory requirement for a lender to disclose
a borrower’s transaction history, the borrower had a right to demand the
same.315 The court imposed on the lender a “good faith duty” to disclose the
borrower’s transaction history and found where they violated that duty such
action constituted tortious conduct.316 In 2005, the Supreme Court again
found that the requirements of Article 17 “must be interpreted strictly” and
where a “revolving credit” contract precluded disclosure of each item
required by Article 17, the lender was not absolved from its duty to disclose
but required to “disclose information corresponding to those items.”317
Finally, in the first three months of 2006, the Supreme Court handed
down a series of decisions that effectively ended gray zone lending. In a
January 13, 2006 decision, the Court examined the acceleration and penalty
provisions found in most loan contracts.318 The provisions were standard:
in the event of default, payment of the remaining principal and interest were
due immediately, with penalties, and with interest on this sum payable at
29.2%.319 The Supreme Court overturned a lower court decision in favor of

312
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the lender declaring that the acceleration clause made the payment of the
gray zone interest coerced rather than voluntary.320
Article 43 was “an exception” that in light of the intent of the statute
to “protect the interests of the borrower” should “be strictly construed.”321
In determining whether “interest was voluntarily paid,” the Court would
look at whether there was “coercion in fact.”322 The Court found that where
there was a liquidated damages and acceleration clause borrowers would pay
the excess interest to avoid the penalties; as a result, absent special
circumstances, “it cannot be said that the borrower paid the portion of
interest in excess of the rate restrictions of their own free will.”323
A January 19 decision quickly followed affirming this holding and
addressing collection practices.324 The Court would require clear evidence
that the excess interest was paid voluntarily, and, with regard to collection
practices, that meant more than proof the lender did not violate laws that
could result in administrative or criminal penalties.325 The courts would
look at the “totality of the circumstances” and whether the borrower paid the
excess interest rate charges “of their own free will.”326
On January 24, 2006, the Court handed down two additional
decisions, both reversing lower courts finding for the lender.327 Both
targeted “daily installment lenders.”328 The Court found in the first January
24 decision that the Article 17 documentation requirements were not met.329
According to the Court, all designated items must be disclosed, and “when
they are not disclosed in a manner that is accurate and clear, the conditions
for applying Article 43 paragraph 1 are not met.”330 The Court found the
language in the contract inaccurate when “moneys received” by the
borrower was not in fact the money tendered by the lender but included a
balance from previous loans.331 The Court found the contract language was
unclear where it described days when the lender would not make collection

320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
1205 HANREI TAIMZU 106, 107 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 19, 2006).
Id.
Id.
1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 85 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 2006); 1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 93 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 24,

2006).
328
1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 85; 1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 93. See supra note 188 defining “daily
installment lenders.”
329
1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 85, 85, 91.
330
Id. at 91.
331
Id.
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calls as “customary holidays when transactions are not done.”332 Daily
installment lenders “must meet in fact” all of the conditions imposed by
statute in order to charge the higher interest rates.333 The Court's second
January 24 decision reiterated that where there was the threat of liquidated
damages and acceleration, payment in excess of the IRRA caps was not
voluntary, and so long as the borrower paid the interest and principal
recognized by law there was no default. 334 With these decisions, Japanese
scholars talked of a “substantive change in the jurisprudence” of the
Court.335
Finally, in Febuary and March 2006, the Supreme Court again
reversed lower courts finding for the lender. In a February decision, the
borrower had borrowed money pledging property as collateral, defaulted,
and entered into a sales agreement with a buy-back option for the same
parcel. The option expired, the lender sought to evict, and the Supreme
Court found the contract “was not a true sales contract with a buy-back
option.” 336 The Court found there was no evidence of intent to transfer and
construed the contract, in substance, as a loan contract subject to the legal
prescriptions on foreclosure.337 In a March decision, the Supreme Court
again strictly interpreted the requirements of Article 18 and struck down a
Cabinet Order.338 While the statute permitted the Cabinet to order
disclosures in addition to those enumerated in the statute, the Cabinet Order
had permitted the substitution of “the contract number” for “the date of
contract” in the lender’s receipt documents. This “exceeded the bounds of
discretion provided in the law and as such is an illegal regulation.” The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, found the Article 18 documentation
requirements not met, and found Article 43 inapplicable.339
In the first three months of 2006, the Supreme Court handed down six
decisions involving finance companies. Each reversed a lower court finding
for the lender. Each strictly construed the documentation requirements and
narrowly construed the provisions in Article 43 permitting lending at gray
zone interest rates. Taken together, they eliminated gray zone lending.
332
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Id. at 92-93.
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1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 93, 96-97 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 2006).
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Ono, supra note 135, at 33.
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60 MINSHŪ 480 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/
pdf/42065DA885C6CC074925710E0026977A.pdf.
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Id.
338
1408 SAIJI 6 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/
pdf/20060405100221.pdf.
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Id. See also 1205 HANREI TAIMUZU 99, 104 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 13, 2006).
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THE 2006 LEGISLATION

A.

The Legislative Process
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After the Supreme Court’s January decisions, claims for the refund of
interest charges spiked.340 First hundreds, then thousands of people filed
suit.341 The industry had already begun to lose in the lower courts and
lobbying to raise or abolish interest rates caps.342 The Supreme Court
decisions sealed their fate in the courts and made it difficult for the Diet to
raise interest rates.343 The consumer finance companies began mediating
cases instead of trying them, and by February 2006, estimates for fiscal year
2005 payments exceeded ¥500 billion.344 The Japanese Association of
Certified Public Accountants called for the industry to book a one time
charge for all associated losses.345 The share prices of the four main
consumer finance companies plunged.346 The consumer finance companies’
“honeymoon relationship” with the banking industry was over.347
The lending laws regulating the consumer finance industry had long
been seen as “Diet legislation.” 348 The result, according to one FSA official,
was that the administrative agencies were not proactive, “though they shared
a bed, they had different dreams (dōshō imu).”349 That changed after the
2006 Supreme Court decisions. The FSA followed the January decisions
announcing in February its plan to eliminate gray zone lending “in response
to the current trend established by the Supreme Court in its de facto rejection
of gray zone interest rates.” 350 The FSA also announced plans to establish a
340
Mitsugetsu Magarikado: Shōshisha Kinyū, te 4 sha Kabuka Kyūraku, ASAHI SHINBUN, May 5,
2006, at 7.
341
Gure- Zo-n Kinri—Higashi Nihon Kurejetto Aite Tori, Saimusha ga Issei Teiso/Iwate, MAINICHI
SHINBUN, Sept. 28, 2006 at 1; 1,800 Debtors Sue to Get Loan Overcharges Back, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov.
14, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20061114b1.html; Kabarai Henkan 500 Oku
Yen: Shōhisha Kinyū 4 sha, Hai-Iro Kinri Seigen de Fue, ASAHI SHINBUN, Feb. 26, 2006, at 3.
342
Hai-Iro Kinri Tettai he, Hōteki Mujun Kaishō Isogu, Shihō Handan ga Atooshi, ASAHI SHINBUN,
Feb. 22, 2006, at 11.
343
Id.
344
Kabarai Henkan 500 Oku Yen: Shōhisha Kinyū, te 4 sha, Hai-Iro Kinri Seigen de Fue, ASAHI
SHINBUN, Feb. 26, 2006, at 3.
345
Id.
346
Mitsugetsu Magarikado, supra note 340; Yuka Hayashi, Japan’s Lending Crackdown May Hurt
Foreign Consumer-Finance Investors, WALL ST. J, Dec. 13, 2006, at C1.
347
Mitsugetsu Magarikado, supra note 340, Kinyū, Ōte 4 sha Kabuka Kyūraku, ASAHI SHINBUN,
May 5, 2006, at 7.
348
Hai-Iro Kinri Tettai he, Hōteki Mujun Kaishō Isogu, Sihō Handan ga Atooshi, ASAHI SHINBUN,
Feb. 22, 2006, at 11.
349
Id.
350
Kashikingyō: “Hai-iro Kinri” Tettai He: Kinyūcho Hōkaisei Hoshin, Saimusha o Kyūsai, ASAHI
SHINBUN, Feb. 22, 2006, at 43.
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new comprehensive Consumer Credit Law, and, as a temporary measure, to
revise its rules to prohibit the use of acceleration clauses incorporating
interest penalties at gray zone rates and to introduce regulations to reduce
excessive lending.351 The latter included investigation and documentation
requirements of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan without jeopardizing
their ability to live or requiring a pledge of their home as collateral.352
The FSA also stepped up enforcement. In April 2006, the FSA shut
down Aiful Corporation as a sanction for systemic loan collection abuses, all
1,700 branches for three days and five branches for twenty to twenty-five
days.353 Aiful had been found attempting to collect on a loan completed with
a borrower diagnosed with dementia, harassing borrowers demanding
repayment, and demanding that borrowers obtain money from third parties
to repay loans.354 In one instance, an Aiful employee dragged a borrower
out of his apartment and forced him to borrow money from a nearby liquor
store to make a loan payment.355 Reports of consumer finance company
employees telling borrowers to kill themselves so the company could collect
the life insurance also surfaced.356 In short order, eighty-one banks
announced they were reconsidering their capital and working relationship
with Aiful.357
Reports of overwhelming numbers of Japanese indebted to consumer
finance companies increased pressure for reform.358 The FSA released
documents showing one in every seven Japanese adults indebted to a lender
reporting to the Federation of Credit Bureaus.359 Reports showed disturbing

351

Id.
Kajō Kashitsuke Kisei Kyōka, Kinyūchō, Hensai no Kyōhi Kinshi, ASAHI SHINBUN, Mar. 6, 2006,
at 43. Violation of these new requirements would result in “administrative guidance” with further penalties
to await the grant of additional statutory authority from revision of the lending laws. Id.
353
Kanako Takahara, FSA Orders Suspension of Aiful, THE JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006; Natsuo
Nishio & Yoshio Takahashi, Industry News: Japan Hands 3-Day Supension to Retail Lender Amid Inquiry,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2006, at B6. See also Mariko Yasu, Despite Loss, Lenders Gain Some Friends, THE
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 8, 2006, at 14.
354
Takahara, supra note 353; Nishio & Takahashi, supra note 353, at B6.
355
Nakamura, supra note 7.
356
Id.
357
81 Kinyū Kikan: Aiful to Teikei Minaoshi, Ro-n ya Senden Jishuku, ASAHI SHINBUN, May 5, 2006,
at 43. Aiful took loan applications on behalf of banks, guaranteed bank loans, and collected on bank loans
in default. Id.
358
Kinyūchō, Kashikingyou Seido Nado ni Kansuru Kondankai no Kaisai ni Tsuite, Tōkei Shiryō
Nado, Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/newsj/16/kinyu/f-20050427-2/2-1.pdf (last visited Mar.
12, 2007); Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19.
359
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 19.
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trends in filings for bankruptcy and in the numbers of financially related
suicides.360
Bankruptcy in Japan:
Individual Filings361
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

11,273
23,288
43,144
43,545
40,385
43,414
56,494
71,299
103,803
122,741
139,280
160,457
214,638
242,357
211,402
184,422

Suicide in Japan: Financially
Related Suicides & Composite
Numbers362
1990
1,272
21,346
1991
1,660
21,084
1992
2,062
22,104
1993
2,484
21,851
1994
2,418
21,670
1995
2,793
22,445
1996
3,025
23,104
1997
3,556
24,391
1998
6,058
32,863
1999
6,758
33,048
2000
6,838
31,957
2001
6,845
31,042
2002
7,940
32,143
2003
8,897
34,427
2004
7,947
32,325
2005
7,956
32,552

Those numbers told only part of the story. While there is a stigma
associated with bankruptcy in Japan, suicide has been described by some as
“honorable.”363
FSA documents showed that the consumer finance
companies took advantage of this: for fiscal year 2005, seventeen consumer
finance companies received a combined ¥4.3 billion in suicide policy
payouts on approximately 4,908 borrowers.364
A deliberative council (shingikai) established by the FSA pursuant to
the 2003 revisions had been meeting for a year and on April 21, 2006
360

Id. at 14-15; Kinyūchō, supra note 358; WEST, supra note 15, at 219. Japan continues to have one
of the highest suicide rates among industrialized countries, a rate approximately twice per capita that found
in the US. Japan to Tackle High Suicide Rate, supra note 17.
361
Kinyūchō, supra note 358; Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 14.
362
Kinyūchō, supra note 358; Keisatsuchō, Heisei 17 Nenjū ni Okeru Jisatsu no Gaiyō Shiryō,
http://www.npa.go.jp/toukei/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
363
WEST, supra note 15, at 249, 257.
364
Kinyūchō, Heisei 18 Nen 3 Gatsuki Shōhisha Shinyō Dantai Seimei Hoken Jisseki, Oct. 6, 2006,
http://www.fsa.go.jp/news/18/20061006-1/01.pdf; Nakamura, supra note 7.
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published its midterm report.365 They recommended eliminating gray zone
lending by lowering interest rates, adding administrative penalties for
excessive lending, requiring lender participation in credit reporting agencies,
and establishing a counseling system for distressed borrowers.366
The LDP quickly followed suit with their own recommendations. In
July 2006, the finance committees for the LDP and Kōmeitō jointly
announced their “Basic Framework Regarding Revision of the
Moneylending Industry.” 367 The LDP committee acknowledged a split
among its members but concluded that new legislation should abolish gray
zone lending and reduce the 29.2% public law caps imposing criminal
penalties to the civil law maximum of 20% found in the IRRA.368
This time the consumer finance industry protested loudly.369 Industry
advocates argued that “many borrowers would be shunted out of the legal
markets, and, as a result, not only will many borrowers be forced into
economic ruin, but they will be susceptible to the coercive measures of the
black market lenders.”370 They argued that reductions in the interest rate
caps would both increase black market lending371 and adversely affect the
entire economy.372 With the proposed interest rate reductions coming on top
of the Bank of Japan’s move from a zero interest rate policy, as many as
4400 small and medium sized lenders would go bankrupt.373 For the large
consumer finance companies, a 5% reduction in interest rates would result in
a loss of ¥500 million in revenue for each.374 Industry representatives

365

Nomura Shūya, Kashikingyō kisei no Arikata, 1319 JURISTO 2 (Sept. 15, 2006).
Id.; Jōgen Kinri 15%-20% ni, Kinyūcho no Yūshikisha Kon Hōanka, Nanko Mo, ASAHI SHINBUN,
Apr. 19, 2006, at 3; Kashikingyō Kisei Hō Kaiseian Jigyousha Riyousha kara Higeki, FUJI SANKEI
BIJUNESU AI, Oct. 1, 2006, at 2.
367
LDP, Kashikingyō Seido nado no Kaikaku ni Kansuru Kihonteki Kangaekata,
http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/seisaku/2006/pdf/seisaku-020.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); Nomura, supra
note 365, at 2.
368
LDP, supra note 367; Nomura, supra note 365, at 2.
369
Nomura, supra note 365, at 2; Ishii Tsuneo, Kashikingyō Seido Kaikaku no Hōkō to Eikyō ni
Tsuite—Kashikingyōkyōkai no Kangaekata, 1319 JURISTO 22 (2006).
370
Ishii, supra note 369, at 22.
371
The argument has been made before. In 1572, Reverend Thomas Wilson, citing Italian jurist
Andreas Alciatus, argued that strict prohibitions against usury led to a system of lending money only by
“the woorst of men, suche as care not for laws and are past al shame.” Taeusch, supra note 30, at 306
(quoting THOMAS WILSON, A DISCOURSE UPON USURY 345 (Tawney ed., 1925) (1572)). See also 2
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *456.
372
Ishii, supra note 369, at 22.
373
Id. at 23.
374
Jōgen Kinri 15%-20% ni, Kinyūcho no Yūshikisha Kon Hōanka, Nanko mo, ASAHI SHINBUN, Apr.
19, 2006, at 3; Kashikingyō Kisei Hō Kaiseian Jigyōsha Riyōsha kara Higeki, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI,
Oct. 1, 2006 at 2; 81 Kinyū Kikan: Aiful to Teikei Minaoshi, Ro-n Ya Senden Jishuku, ASAHI SHINBUN,
May 5, 2006, at 43.
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predicted restructuring of close to 30,000 employees.375 Researchers
predicted a reduction in Japan’s gross domestic product of over ¥2 trillion.376
The LDP then proposed lowering the caps from 29.2% to 20% three
years after the law went into effect and adding a special ordinance
permitting interest rate charges up to 28% for five years. In effect, the LDP
proposed a delay of nine years before any real reduction. The LDP also
proposed limiting loans to new borrowers to ¥500,000 per year or ¥300,000
per six months, requiring investigation of the borrower’s ability to repay
loans over ¥1 million, and increasing criminal penalties.377 At the same
time, however, they sought increases in the IRRA caps so that interest rates
of up to 20% could be charged on loans up to ¥500,000, 18% charged on
loans up to ¥5 million, and 15% on loans in excess of ¥5 million.378 In other
words, the LDP proposed a 2% increase in the caps applicable to most
consumer loans and a 3% increase on larger loans up to ¥5 million.
There was a backlash from the opposition parties, as expected.379 The
Japan Federation of Bar Associations and consumer interest groups also
protested.380 The Bar argued that the spike in lending by organized crime
that led to the 2003 legislation was the result of a conscious strategy
implemented in the mid-1990s and not the result of the previous reductions
in the interest rate caps.381 They pointed to interest rates cuts from 54.75%
to 29.2% during the fifteen years from 1991-2006 and, at the same time, the
number of borrowers doubling.382 They argued that the LDP proposal was
unmitigated “industry protection.”383
Outside the LDP, sympathy for the consumer finance industry was
limited. Financial numbers for Takefuji, Acom, Promise and Aiful stood in
stark contrast to the statistics released for personal bankruptcies and

375

Ishii, supra note 369, at 24.
Id.
Ihan Gyōsha ni Keijibatsu Kōkinri Tokurei, Kojin wa Saichō 5 nen Seifu,
Kashikingyōkiseikyoukaan o Teiji, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 6, 2006.
378
Id.
379
Kashikingyō Kisei no Seido Minaoshi Iken Shūyaku Mochikoshi Jimin, Tokureikikan 3 nen no
Hōkō, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://www.businessi.jp/print/article/2006091200333a.nwc; Kashikingyō Kisei de Minaoshi Tokurei 2nen, 25.5% de Kecchaku
Jimin Gōdō Kaigi de Kecchaku, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.business-i.jp/news/sou-page/news/200609160028aq.nwc; Kashikingyō Kisei, Jimin ga
Kecchaku Yotōnaini Ondosa Hōan Seiritsu nao Hai-Iro, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006.
380
Risoku Seigenhō “Riage” ni Hanpatsu Kashikingyō seido no Minaoshi “Jimintōan ha Gyōsha
Hogo”, TOKYO SHINBUN, Oct. 5, 2006, at 10.
381
Utsunomiya, supra note 2, at 18-19.
382
Id. at 19.
383
Id.
376
377
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suicides.384 The 2004 numbers disseminated by the FSA showed the four
main consumer finance companies borrowing from the banks at less than 2%
and lending at 27% to 29%.385 Each had over ¥1 billion in outstanding loans
and over two million outstanding loan accounts.386 Each had before tax
operating profits of approximately ¥1 billion.387 The top four consumer
finance companies all ranked in the top forty companies in Japan in terms of
declared taxable income, with Acom just below Sharp Corp. and Takefuji
just above Japan Tobacco.388
For the first time, there was also a backlash within the LDP.389 Older
LDP members argued the proposal would “deal a mortal blow” to the
consumer finance industry and decrease the credit available to consumers.390
Younger LDP members argued in response that only the elimination of gray
zone lending would address the growing problems of a class of borrowers
that has arisen not as a result of profligate spending but a result of the
unemployment and bankruptcies that occurred throughout the 1990s.391
Less than two weeks after its initial proposal, the FSA submitted a
new proposal to the LDP. The new proposal maintained the increases in the
IRRA caps, but scaled back the special ordinance provisions from five years
to two and reduced the special rate from 28% to 25.5%.392 Masusumi
Gōtōda, a young LDP member appointed by the Prime Minister to the
Cabinet as a Director of Financial and Economic Policy, resigned his
position in protest calling this compromise proposal “the worst possible

384
Kinyūchō, supra note 358; NTA, Heisei 15 Nendo Kessan Daihōjin no Shinkoku Shotoku Jōi
50sha Juni Hyō, http://www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/press/press/2004/0410-07/01.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
385
Kinyūchō, supra note 358; NTA, Heisei 15, supra note 384; Ustunomiya, supra note 2, at 16. As
of June 2006, the average bank lending rate was 1.63%. Ustunomiya, supra note 2, at 16. For the five
years up until July 2006, the central bank’s short-term interest rate was zero, as of March 2007 it is 0.5%.
Yuka Hayashi, Japanese Addiction: Currency Bets—Small Investors, Acting ‘Like an Enormous Hedge
Fund,’ Help Push the Yen Around, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2007, at C1.
386
Kinyūchō, supra note 358.
387
Id.
388
Id. In 2002, Takefuji ranked 11th in terms of declared income, followed by Acom at 12th, Aiful at
20th, and Promise at 21st. NTA, Heisei 12 Nendo Kessan Daihōjin no Shinkoku Shotoku Jōi 50sha Juni
Hyō, Jan. 9, 2001 http://www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/press/press/2001/0109/01.htm.
389
Nyu-su Saizensen—Shōshisha Kinyū—Kashikingyouhōkaisei demo nao Nokoru Ooku no Mondai,
SHŪKAN TŌYŌ KEIZAI, Sept. 30, 2006.
390
Id.
391
Id.; Keizai Juku—Dai 24 Kai—Tajū Saimusha Mondai niha Kinri Seigen Igai de Kaiketsu Subeki
Da, SHŪKAN TŌYŌ KEIZAI, Oct. 14, 2006, at 13.
392
Kashikingyō Kisei de Minaoshi Tokurei 2nen, 25.5% de Kecchaku Jimin Gōdō Kaigi de
Kecchaku, FUJI SANKEI BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006; Keizai Juku—Dai 24 Kai—Tajū Saimusha Mondai
niha Kinri Seigen Igai de Kaiketsu Subeki Da, SHŪKAN TŌYŌ KEIZAI, Oct. 14, 2006, at 13.
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outcome.” 393 In media interviews, he blasted the LDP for twenty years of
indifference and strong ties to the consumer finance industry. He disclosed
that the first proposals for reform were from industry factions within the
LDP and were intended to eliminate the caps.394 He argued the LDP
proposals flew in the face of the council report and vowed to continue to
protest “as a single party member.” 395
Industry had not requested the special ordinance.396 Worried about the
combined hit from lawsuit related losses and reduced revenue from the
proposed interest rate reductions, they opposed the elimination of the gray
zone lending.397 They were not alone. The U.S. Department of Treasury and
U.S. financial companies strongly criticized the proposed reforms.398
Citigroup and General Electric Co. were active operators in Japan’s
¥20 trillion consumer finance industry.399 The finance division of General
Electric had purchased Honobono Reiku, the sixth largest lender in the
consumer finance industry, in 1998.400 The Citigroup subsidiary CFJ
purchased Deikku Aiku in 2003, then the fifth largest lender in the
industry.401 Foreign investors owned 20% to 34% of the stock of Aiful,
Promise, and Acom.402 Takefuji, the largest finance company, had listed on
the London Stock Exchange in 2000, and, by 2006, foreign investors owned
56% of its voting stock.403 Takefuji sought to reassure investors with fullpage advertisments in the Wall Street Journal promoting its “voluntary
efforts towards a sound consumer finance market.” 404 It also announced an
increase in its annual dividend to over 5%.405 The foreign lobby argued

393
Gōtōda Masuzumi (Shūingiin) “Kashikingyō Kisei hō" Kaisei o Meguri, Kinyū Tantou Seimukan
Jinin no Shinso wo Gekihaku “Honenuki” no Kaiaku ha Tetteiteki ni Hihan shi, Saigo made Tatakaimasu”,
KEIZAIKAI, Oct. 17, 2006.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Kashikingyō Kisei, Jimin ga Kecchaku Yotōnaini Ondosa Hōan Seiritsu nao Hai-Iro, FUJI SANKEI
BIJUNESU AI, Sept. 16, 2006.
397
Id.
398
Yamanaka Izumi, Sarakin Kisei ni Igi Ari, NEWSWEEK [NIHONGOBAN] Sept. 20, 2006, at 45;
Hayashi, supra note 346, at C1.
399
Both companies lobbied against lowering the ceiling for interest charges. Justin Baer & Mariko
Yasu, Citigroup to Shut 80% of Consumer-Loan Units in Japan (Update4), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 8, 2007 (on
file with Journal).
400
Yamanaka, supra note 398, at 45.
401
Id.
402
Id.
403
Id.
404
Takefuji, Japan's Leading Consumer Finance Co.-Facts and Figures, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2006,
at A9.
405
Id.
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legislation should strengthen the regulation of illegal practices and the blackmarket moneylenders, but interest rates should be left to the markets.406
By the end of October, the debate was over, and the special ordinance
calling for a ceiling of 25.5% on small short-term loans was withdrawn.407
The Cabinet formalized a bill on October 31, 2006 for submission to a
special session of the Diet.408 It would lower interest rates ceilings within
three years, limit loans to borrowers, as well as implement stricter
procedural requirements including a ban on lenders taking out life insurance
policies on borrowers that covered suicide.409
B.

An Outline of the 2006 Legislation

Announcements by both Takefuji and Aiful in November of their first
ever net loss were followed by Acom and Promise posting losses as a result
of the set-asides to pay claims, but that made no difference.410 On December
20, 2006, the Diet passed Law No. 115 of 2006.411
The legislation is to be implemented in four stages.412 The first stage
took effect January 2007 and, pursuant to Article 1, immediately raised the
criminal penalties in the Money Lending Industry Regulation Act for
unregistered moneylenders to a maximum of ten years imprisonment and/or
a fine of ¥30 million.413 At the same time, the Investments, Deposits, and
Interest Rates Act was revised to establish the same penalties for receipt of
or demand for payment of interest in excess of 109.5% per annum.414
Article 2 sets out changes to take place within a year of
promulgation.415 It expands the conditions under which the FSA can refuse
406

Yamanaka, supra note 398, at 45.
Cabinet OKs Bill to Cap Lender Rates, End Suicide Insurance, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 1, 2006,
available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nb20061101a3.html.
408
Id.
409
Id.
410
Borrower Reimbursment Charge Pushes Takefuji into First-Ever Loss, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 2,
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to accept the registration of a lender to include those circumstances where
the applicant has not developed the necessary business structure to
appropriately engage in the moneylending industry and where the applicant
is recognized to have engaged in other businesses contrary to the public
interest.416 The Article requires that the moneylender or its agent establish
systems to appropriately handle information relating to prospective
borrowers, and it prohibits the use of false or misleading information or the
omission of material information regarding the contract.417
Article 2 prohibits lenders from taking out life insurance policies on
borrowers that payoff in the event of suicide, and requires the borrower’s
consent to otherwise conclude life insurance contracts that name the lender
as a beneficiary.418 It requires the lender “to make efforts” to introduce
prospective borrowers who are found in need of assistance to credit
counseling services.419 It adds a suitability provision, requiring lenders to
conduct their business in a manner that does not lead to “unsuitable
solicitation” that disadvantages prospective borrowers in light of the
borrower’s knowledge, experience, finances, and purpose for entering into
the loan contract.420
Article 2 imposes a duty on the lender to provide additional written
disclosures to joint guarantors and in contracts establishing a line of
credit.421 It states that a lender may not refuse a borrower’s request to
examine transaction records absent clear evidence the request is made for
improper purposes.422 It requires disclosures to the borrower explaining the
compulsory foreclosure provisions that arise with the completion of a
notarized contract.423 The Article requires advance disclosure of the total
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amount of principal and interest necessary to repay the loan.424 It also now
restricts collection calls and home visits during the day, absent a justifiable
reason, where the borrower has made a request regarding the time for
repayment. It prohibits the lender from remaining at the borrower’s home or
place of business after the borrower has requested that the lender leave the
premises.425
Article 2 of the 2006 legislation also strengthens administrative
oversight providing for administrative orders when deemed necessary to
protect the interest of the borrower, or to change or reform designated
business practices.426
Where lending practices violate the law or
administrative dispositions, the lender’s registration may be canceled or an
order issued suspending all or a portion of the lender’s business or removing
its directors.427 All moneylenders must now provide regular business
reports, and either belong to a self regulatory industry association licensed
by the Prime Minister’s Office, or submit to “appropriate supervision” by the
government based on the business practice guidelines established by the
association.428
Within one and one-half years of enforcement of the Article 2
requirements, Article 3 increases the basic capital requirements for the
moneylending industry to an amount established by cabinet order not below
¥20 million and begins an examination system for the compliance officers
within the finance companies.429 During this stage, a system of designated
credit reporting agencies, licensed by the Prime Minister’s Office, is to be
established,430 replacing the current hodge-podge of organizations with
voluntary membership and limited information sharing.431 Regulations are
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT ET AL., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES, AND COMMENTARY 46, 54
(2006).
424
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relating to the provision of counseling services. It is to establish bylaws for the assessment of penalties for
members that violate these regulatory provisions, including the restriction or suspension of rights of
membership, and expulsion from the self-regulatory decision. Id.
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to be promulgated regarding the sharing of information among the credit
reporting agencies, mandatory membership by lenders, and licensing and
approval of the agencies.432
Finally, within two and one-half years of enforcement of the Article 2
provisions, Article 4 provides that lenders are required to have at each place
of business a registered compliance officer who has passed the examination
administered by the Prime Minister’s Office, and the cabinet order is to be
revised to require basic operating capital in excess of ¥50 million.433 The
conclusion of contracts along with the receipt or demand for payment of
interest charges in excess of the IRRA caps will be prohibited. Prior to
completing the contract, the lender will be required to investigate the
customer’s ability to repay the loan, and, if the prospective borrower is an
individual, obtain a credit history from a designated credit information
agency. The lender is then prohibited from completing loan contracts for
amounts that exceed the borrower’s ability to repay.434 Where the lender
offers a loan in excess of ¥500,000 or a loan that results in debt loads in
excess of ¥1 million, the lender must also obtain proof of annual income.435
Absent other designated liquid assets, the lender is then prohibited from
lending an amount either individually or in conjunction with other lenders
that exceeds one-third of the customer’s annual income.436 Where a contract
establishes a line of credit, the lender will be required to establish
monitoring systems to regularly obtain credit information from a designated
credit information agency regarding repayment ability. The lender must then
limit additional financing so that the total outstanding loans held by the
borrower does not exceed one-third of their annual income.437
At this point, Article 43, which provides for “voluntary payment” of
interest charges in excess of the statutory maximums, will be abolished and
associations, credit card companies, and bank affiliated moneylenders; 2) CIC Corporation offers services
to approximately 750 members consisting primarily of credit associations, credit card companies, and
guarantee companies; 3) the National Bank Individual Credit Information Center has approximately 1500
member banks, bank affiliated credit card companies; and 4) CCB Corporation has about 500 members
across the banking, credit card company, and moneylending industries. The result is that information
regarding consumer debt is fragmented and an individual consumer’s overall debt-level very difficult to
assess. Nomura, supra note 365, at 7.
432
Nomura, supra note 365, at 7. The Prime Minister’s office is also to establish rules for the
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practice improvement orders, and removal of designation provisions.
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along with it “gray zone lending.”438 In conjunction with this, Article 5
provides for the IRRA’s revision to include special rules regulating the
apportionment of payment where the borrower and lender have entered into
multiple lending contracts, and anticipatory damages on default are to be
limited to 20%.439 Special rules will also incorporate any guarantee fees
paid with the interest rate charged, subjecting both to the maximum interest
rate restrictions.440
When these amendments take effect, Article 7 of the 2006 law will
also amend the Investments, Deposits, and Interest Rates Act to lower
interest rates caps on commercial moneylenders from 29.2% to 20%.441 The
special ordinances permitting higher interest rates from lending by “daily
installment lenders” will be abolished.442 The law concludes by mandating
that the government make efforts to develop comprehensive policies to
address the problem of distressed borrowers and provides for review of the
act within two and a half years after enforcement of all its provisions.443
C.

The Fallout from the 2006 Supreme Court Cases and Legislation

Shortly after the passage of the 2006 law, the Prime Minister’s Office
established a Distressed Borrowers Task Force.444 It charged the task force
with developing a counseling program for borrowers, “a social safety net,”
improving financial and economic education, and strengthening regulation
of black-market lenders.
Citigroup boosted loan-loss reserves by $375 million and announced
that it would shut about 80% of its consumer finance branches and 100 loan
machines in Japan.445 Acom followed suit announcing it would cut 700 jobs
and close 135 outlets to reduce costs.446 GE announced it would review its
438
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business in Japan “to determine the best way forward.”447 Foreign investors
announced the legislation was “very clearly the worst-case outcome for the
consumer finance industry.”448
While lawyers and activists applauded the legislation, critics
continued to argue that it will adversely affect the broader economy by
restricting consumer spending and cause a flood of new bad loans when
credit dries up for borrowers servicing debt or, worse yet, cause an increase
in black-market lending.449 The American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo
suggested the legislation would lead to a “large constriction in the supply of
credit, undercutting the current economic recovery.”450 Standard & Poor’s
estimated that the changes will cut outstanding loans at consumer finance
companies in half from then current levels of ¥14.2 trillion, and if 80% of
these loans were presumed to be used for consumption, national
consumption would drop 2% cutting gross domestic product (“GDP”) by
1.1%. 451
Quarterly reports for the first part of 2007 suggest that credit has dried
up for consumers presenting the greatest credit risk. For the four largest
finance companies, average loan completion rates and outstanding loan
balances are down almost 10%.452 Quarterly profits trended up due to cost
cutting, restructuring, and reduced payouts on claims, but payouts on claims
are expected to rise again.453 The Supreme Court recently held that
borrowers may demand interest from the consumer finance companies, at the
legally prescribed rate of 5%, on all illegal gray zone interest payments
made to the finance companies.454 The borrowers have now become the
creditors, earning interest on money unwittingly loaned to the finance
companies. Most recently, Promise, the third largest finance company,
announced its intention to merge with Sanyō Shinpan Finance, the fifth
largest.455 Other companies are reported to have begun shifting resources to
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Korea where interest rates are currently capped at 66% and industry
regulation less severe.456
IV.

BROADER IMPLICATIONS

If the GDP numbers are anywhere close to accurate, the legislation
will measurably harm the Japanese economy, and reports already show that
it has measureably reduced credit, as expected. Which raises the question:
why did the legislation pass? The question is answered by returning to the
immediate events that preceded it: years of recession, growing unease with
“the debt problem,” an activist Japanese Supreme Court, and younger
members of the LDP with enough clout to pass legislation providing relief to
consumers but antithetical to industry and efficient markets.
A.

The Tokugawa Era

The question can also be answered in a broader context. This is not
the first time the Japanese have adopted legislation that constricts the supply
of credit. In 1842, a Tokugawa magistrate protested such restrictions.457 His
recommendations for reform were adopted and almost immediately replaced
by substantive limitations on interest rates and litigation.458 The same
question arises there: why would the Tokugawa Shogunate repeatedly issue
orders dismissing all money suits and repeatedly adjust interest rate caps
from 20% to 5%, knowing this was harmful to the broader economy?
Self-interest is one simple answer.459 It motivated both procedural and
substantive regulation. As rulers and arbiters, the Tokugawa made
procedural modifications seeking efficiency, and they invalidated “charges
under various names” and incomplete loan instruments seeking
compliance.460 More importantly, they sought to protect their base. The
Tokugawa rulers sat at the apex of a military class of landowners and
bureaucrats who were prohibited from engaging in commerce but required to
live according to their station.461 They were heavily in debt and when the
Council of State and Chamber of Decisions made collection difficult,
456
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dismissed all lawsuits, and retroactively reduced interest rates on money
loans, they protected their own.462 They demonstrated “compassion” for the
“pecuniary difficulties” of the military gentry, with full recognition that they
were “injuriously affecting” the circulation of money.463
The ruling class engaged in an ongoing attempt to substantively
manage the market without stifling it.464 They sought to impose a
substantively fair price, no more than fair consideration for money lent.465 If
recoinage of gold and silver caused an increase in grain prices, that would
justify higher interest rates.466 Conversely if those grain prices fell, interest
rates should as well, or the government would decree it so.467 In repeatedly
adjusting interest rates ex post there was little concern demonstrated for
procedural fairness and great concern for “fair consideration.” The
Tokugawa Shogunate served those in power by substantively managing the
market.
Confucian-inspired paternalism offered both a justification for
regulating the money markets as well as guiding principles in doing so.468
One sees a fundamentally public law regime wherein civil litigation was
both disfavored, and yet commonplace.469 “Didactic conciliation”470
occurred within the shadow of “didactic litigation,” with the government
using the civil litigation process to enforce a private order outside the
courts.471 That order dictated that “the lending and borrowing of money
originates as a matter of private arrangement between the parties, and hence
there is no necessity for [the court’s] undertaking and judging disputes of
that sort.”472 It decreed that the parties were to carry out their obligations
with a “true sense of their mutual duties” or be punished severely.473
Confucian paternalism explains not only the government’s conception
of its role in private law disputes and its expectations of the parties, but also
its willingness to move beyond self-interest. Tokugawa magistrates sought
to prohibit representation by “person[s] skilled in litigation,” in order to
prevent “unfounded suits” for “petty arrearage against country people” and
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
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suits where “a person takes advantage of the poverty or ignorance of
another.”474 At the same time, they granted special privileges to the blind as
creditors475 and, in doing so, again moved beyond simply protecting those in
power.
Usury law in Tokugawa Japan evidenced substantive regulation
stemming from both self-interest and at least an intent to incorporate the
“reciprocal ethical duties of benevolence” required of those in power and
discussed in the literature.476 Both influence practice today.
B.

The Meiji, Taisho, and Pre-World War II Showa Eras

The Meiji Reformation marked a fundamental shift from substantive
regulation of contract to freedom of contract. In terms of private law and
usury law, that shift appeared early on in pronouncements by the Great
Council of State and the Codification Committee.477 Both adopted a “new”
philosophy of freedom of contract.478 Boissonade’s proposals codifying
continued paternalism were vigously debated and rejected.479 The interest
rate restrictions from the Meiji IRRA remained but only as a compromise.480
The nineteenth century cases from the Great Court of Cassation
defined that compromise.481 Professor Kawashima in his writings on
litigiousness in Japan noted that disputes between a usurer and debtor exist
in a “social vacuum,” and “[s]ince the Meiji era . . . , long before
industrialization was under way, official statistics have shown a surprisingly
large number of cases involving claims of this sort.”482 The courts resolved
this surprising large number of cases by restrictively interpreting the
applicability of the IRRA.483 They found the IRRA inapplicable to nonmonetary loans, liquidated damage provisions in monetary loans, and in
474
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some cases commercial loans.484 The court followed these cases in the early
twentieth century by repeatedly invoking the principle of freedom of
contract in defense of their rejection of borrower’s claims.485 Both were
accompanied by a shift in focus from the intent of the government to the
intent of the parties. In these cases, the courts focused on “the agreement of
the parties” and rejected claims of unjust enrichment where the interest was
“voluntarily paid.”486 The courts rejected claims that loans were void as
against public policy absent “cruel circumstances.”487
Japanese scholars describe a conservative court narrowly interpreting
the law.488 There is arguably more to it. During this period, the court
evolved from a public law centered organ of the state to a separate judiciary
sitting as arbiters of private disputes. This shift from public to private was
accompanied by an evolution from a substantive conception of justice to a
formal one. With few exceptions, private law now focused on the intent of
the parties and the freedom of those parties to structure their relationship,
without regard for state interests and limited concern for the public
welfare.489
Scholars describe a similar evolution in the United States during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: from a substantive conception of
justice to a formal one, one that implemented purely “legal” rules that served
new interests in a market economy.490 According to Professor Horwitz, by
the mid-1800s in the United States the early anti-commercial legal doctrines
found in the common law had been undermined “and the legal system had
almost completely shed its eighteenth century commitment to regulating the
substantive fairness of economic exchange.”491
Law, once conceived of as protective, regulative, paternalistic
and, above all, a paramount expression of the moral sense of the
community, had come to be thought of as facilitative of
484
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individual desires and as simply reflective of the existing
organization of economic and political power.492
The statement is an apt description of what occurred in Japan during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but it is not a perfect fit. The law
was never perceived of as a paramount expression of the moral sense of the
community. It was conceived of as a paramount expression of the moral
sense of the Tokugawa Shogunate, but it was regulative and paternalistic.493
With the Meiji Reformation that conception of law changed. The judiciary
would interpret substantive regulation such as the IRRA narrowly.494 The
focus shifted to individual desires and the agreement of the parties, as
reflected in the contract.495 The courts’ conception of civil justice evolved to
more closely reflect and facilitate economic power.
C.

The Post-World War II Showa and Heisei Eras

What is perhaps most remarkable about this evolution is that, in
contrast to the United States, Japan shifted back. The Meiji Reformation and
importation of Western legal ideas helped to develop a new conception of
private law. The end of World War II and the rise of an independent
Supreme Court resulted in a second transformation where the courts again
committed to enforcing substantive legal standards and the fairness of
economic exchange, albeit with a far less heavy hand than their Tokugawa
predecessors and with different beneficiaries.496
The courts have come once again to view law as a protective,
regulative, paternalistic and now, above all, a paramount expression of the
moral sense of the community. Now, Professor Horwitz’s description is
entirely apt. The Japanese courts explicitly voice this when they invoke the
“consensus of society” (shakai tsūnen) or “sense of society” (shakai kannen)
in formulating norms and deciding civil law cases.497 While some dismiss
this as a “hortatory device,” as Professor Haley notes, what is significant is
that “judges themselves still feel bound by what they themselves discern as
the community norm.”498
492
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Within the civil law sphere, there has been a movement back from a
formalistic conception of justice, one limited to ensuring procedural fairness.
After the appointment of ten new post-war Supreme Court justices between
1962 and 1964, the Supreme Court, prompted by the lower courts,
changed.499 It became increasingly assertive, enforcing a substantive
conception of fairness, through very formalistic reasoning.500 The 1954
IRRA codified the “voluntary payment” doctrine adopted by the Great Court
of Cassation and limited substantive application of the act.501 The Supreme
Court in 1964 and 1968 effectively nullified that legislative
pronouncement.502 They reasoned first by analogy that payment of interest
beyond the caps was similar to discounted interest and would reduce the
amount of principle.503 Once that debt on the principal was extinguished,
payment was made on a “non-debt” and subject to claims of unjust
enrichment.504 At this point, the court began to explicitly acknowledge a
need “to protect the economically disadvantaged borrower.”505
An LDP driven by industry interests and the Diet rolled back this new
judicial doctrine in 1983 legislation, to counter what one Japanese scholar
described as “social ordering” by the Supreme Court.506 The lower courts
immediately began to limit this new legislation, and, after 1990, the
Supreme Court uniformly agreed.507 The courts left the cries for equity,
fairness, and debtor protection to the Japanese bar and consumer groups, but
through strictly “legal” interpretations of narrow aspects of the law the
Supreme Court changed the whole and changed it drastically.508
The courts found Article 43 from the 1983 legislation validating gray
zone interest rate charges applicable only “where the conditions imposed are
strictly met.”509 The courts strictly interpreted what it meant for the
borrower to “voluntarily pay interest” and for the lender to provide all the
required disclosures.510 For the latter, “from the standpoint of consumer
protection,” that meant “all items” accurately disclosed without exception.511
499
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The courts would not countenance a lender using “its superior position” to
force acceptance of less.512 The courts found it was not that difficult for a
“large-scale money lender with a nationwide business operation” to comply
with the disclosure requirements.513 The courts sought to “cause the
borrower to clearly understand the costs associated with the debt.”514 For
the borrower, voluntary payment of interest meant payment that was not
coerced in fact by the threat of liquidated damages or default. The courts
would look not only at whether there was compliance with the minimum
standards established by criminal and administrative regulation, but at the
“totality of the circumstances” in determining whether the borrower paid
excess interest charges “of their own free will.”515 In doing so, the courts are
defining substantive justice, establishing substantive rather than procedural
standards.
The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power to review
sixteen consumer finance cases in eight years, six in 2006, finding each
contained important issues involving the interpretation of law.516 All of them
restrictively interpreted the lending laws; all of them found for the borrower.
In 2003, when the Supreme Court held that guarantee fees paid to guarantee
companies wholly owned by a lender shall be construed as interest charged
by the lender, they were imposing substantive restraints rather than
acknowledging legal forms separating ownership.517 In 2004, when the
Supreme Court held that Article 18 documents must be provided
concurrently with or immediately after payment—not twenty days later, not
ten days later, and not before—they imposed a substantive restraint on
electronic transactions between the lender and borrower.518 In 2005, when
the Supreme Court interpreted “good faith” to require the lender disclose the
borrower’s transaction records and imposed tort liability for failure to do so,
they substantively regulated the relationship.519 In 2006, when the Supreme
Court refused to apply Article 43 where there is coercion in fact, where the
borrower may have felt obliged to pay the excess interest charges to avoid
512
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incurring penalities, they nullified Article 43.520 The Court eliminated any
exception to the IRRA and substantively applied the interest rate caps.521
When the Supreme Court invalidated the Cabinet Order permitting
substitution of “the contract number” for “the date of the contract,” it
enforced a substantive interpretation of the statute that facilitated to the
greatest extent possible the borrower’s understanding of his debt.522
At this point, in 2006, the LDP and the Diet followed suit. The
younger members of the LDP championed the substantive restrictions
imposed by the Supreme Court and, despite the best efforts of industry and
free market advocates, passed legislation that added both substantive and
procedural protections for the borrower.523 Gray zone interest lending was
eliminated.524 The interest rate caps were lowered.525 Lenders will now
have a duty, enforced by administrative sanction, to ensure the borrower
does not borrow too much, no more than one-third their annual income.526
Why didn’t the LDP and the Diet simply increase penalties for illegal
collection tactics? Scholars have argued that “what Japan really needs is
facilitation of finance by legitimate institutions to drive the mob out of
business.”527 Industry has argued that legislative reform should strengthen
the regulation of illegal practices within the industry.528 A review of the
cycles of reported abuse, public outcry, and then legislation suggests that
tens of thousands of Japanese are not commiting suicide and fleeing into the
night because some nice young man in a suit and tie knocked on their door
and respectfully asked them to repay the money they owe. They commit
suicide and flee into the night because there are employees calling from
karaoke boxes screaming that they pay the money back, because there are
employees demanding payment from family and friends, because there are
employees demanding they sell an eye to repay their loan.
All of these ills are corrected by ensuring fair process not adjusting
interest rates. The Japanese, however, continue to adjust interest rates, and
the reason is that substantive justice remains important in Japan. While it
may have been abandoned in the United States in the nineteenth century, the
concept of substantive justice remains firmly embedded in Japan in the
520
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twenty-first century.529 That in turn leads to a greater acceptance of and
demand for substantive regulation. The scandals resulting in new legislation
arise as a result of the consumer finance companies and black market
lenders’ harsh collection tactics. The bureaucracy, Diet, and judiciary
address the issue by drafting new law as new abuses are uncovered, but they
are not willing to stop with procedure. There is a demand for substantive
justice that leads them to adjust interest rates, adjust maximum penalties and
liquidated damages, and, in the case of the judiciary, invalidate statutory
provisions that allow creditors beyond those points.530
V.

CONCLUSION

In looking at usury law in Japan, the lenders and the borrowers each
have a story to tell: from the blind lenders and indebted samurai in
Tokugawa Japan, to Susumu Kajima the “king of the black market money
lenders” in post Bubble Japan, and the elderly family that “apologized” for
their debt by jumping in front of a train. The ruling authorities, from the
Tokugawa Shogunate, Meiji Oligarchy, and pre-World War II governments
to the LDP after the war have also left their mark; some were for, others
against, and most beholden to the consumer finance industry.
At the same time, the story of usury law in Japan is in many respects a
story about the judiciary. Starting in the Edo period we see judges who did
not see themselves as judges: judges who disfavored commerce and
disfavored litigation; judges who passed judgment as a necessary evil, and
refused to pass judgment as a matter of policy. The Meiji Reformation
changed that by creating a professional judiciary that followed the Civil
Code model and possessed a fundamentally transformed view of private law,
litigation and litigants. Commerce was no longer disfavored, nor was
litigation to the same degree, but the judiciary had adopted a view of private
ordering that limited their role. Within the courts, private law as opposed to
public law was fundamental, but among unrelated parties so was freedom of
contract. Finally, in the years since World War II, the Japanese judiciary has
come to exercise enormous influence in the realm of private law, far more
than in public or administrative law, and it no longer limits itself to
discerning the intent of the parties or seeking to enforce procedural fairness
in the market.
529
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The courts have rejected to a far larger degree than found in the
United States deeply ingrained notions of freedom of contract and rule by
and for the market place. They have found as their raison d’etre leveling the
playing field in areas of Japanese society that have escaped the attention of
the bureaucracy and legislature or, more often, where vested interests have
tied the hands of the bureaucracy and legislature. Usury regulation in Japan
provides an example of the postwar judiciary’s repeated willingness not only
to go against the grain, but to hand down decisions that negate legal norms
established by the bureaucracy and the Diet.
In looking at writings on the Japanese judiciary, one sees an evolution
that does not necessarily reflect this activism. The Japanese judiciary was
long viewed “as by far the least influential, much less dangerous, branch” of
the Japanese government.531 Scholars wrote about the dearth of Supreme
Court decisions challenging the constitutionality of legislation and
administrative actions.532
They were followed by increased attention to the Japanese judiciary’s
role as “agents of legal change” working to preserve relationships.533 They
limited community ostracism,534 explusion from the family535 and contested
divorce.536
They restrictively interpreted lease contracts permitting
537
eviction and unilateral termination of a business relationship538 or an
employment relationship.539 According to this scholarship, “[t]he effect is
less . . . to protect the weak against the strong than to prevent unilateral
rupture and, in so doing, to confirm community.”540
Later work noted that judicial activism was not limited to the service
of stable relationships and community. The courts have developed broadranging judicial norms governing the resolution of disputes involving traffic
531
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accidents,541 bankruptcy,542 and securities law.543 More than maintaining
relationships, the courts balance the rights and duties of the parties. In most
of these cases, the courts have moved to fill a perceived void in public law
and to provide remedies most suited to a determination of the rights and
liabilities of private actors.544
This work again shows judicial activism that does not maintain a
relationship or social structure. While most transactions between borrowers
and consumer finance companies are part of an ongoing relationship, there is
no “relationship” to preserve. The parties are antagonistic,545 and when the
courts repeatedly recognize the right of the borrower to a set-off and
thereafter claims for unjust enrichment, they extract the borrower from that
relationship. This work also shows, contrary to earlier pronouncements, that
the judiciary exists not simply to fill “lacunae left by legislative and
administrative inaction”546 but works, at times, in an antagonistic
relationship with the bureaucracy and the Diet. The courts in adjudicating
private law disputes do not necessarily “enforce” or “reflect the policy
preferences of the LDP,”547 but at times the exact opposite. Examining the
pattern of legislation and judicial response in the area of usury law suggests
that the courts have set out to limit and then nullify those LDP sponsored
provisions that they found unsuitable. In this area of the law, the courts have
focused on applying substantive justice, not LDP policy, and demonstrated
an intent to protect the weak from the strong, not to confirm community.548
At the same time, this area of the law shows that the courts are not
necessarily uniform and do not necessarily march in lockstep with the
541
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Supreme Court. Judges are “virtually life-time employees of a national
governmental bureaucracy called the judiciary,”549 but that national
governmental bureaucracy, at least in the area of usury law, has responded to
and not driven the judges in the lower courts. The modern Supreme Court
has, with few exceptions, followed the lead of the lower courts in adopting
liberal positions that respond to the perceived needs of Japanese society.
In doing so, it has functioned as a remarkably democratic institution,
not in terms of bureaucratic structure, but in terms of how normative rules
are created and what those rules are: grants of far greater power to the
individual borrowers than recognized by the Diet or bureaucracy. That
power takes the form of increasing recognition of private rights of action and
far more expansive remedies than contemplated by statute.
In this context as well, the courts’ treatment of usury law is part of a
broader trend. The courts, followed by the Diet, have increasingly
recognized new private rights of action.550 In the context of usury law, the
courts repeatedly recognized private rights of action denied in the statutes,
first in 1964, then in 1968, and again in 2006.551 With other consumer
contracts, the courts began voiding consumer transactions in the 1990s that
violated administrative regulations.552 The Diet followed in 2000 enacting
the Consumer Contract Act codifying new private rights of action.553
Following years of lower court and then Supreme Court decisions, the Diet
enacted in 2000 the Financial Product Sales Act recognizing a private right
of action for the broker’s breach of the “duty to explain.”554
In 2004, the Diet revised a law regulating telephone, home, and
catalogue sales (tokushōhō) to incorporate new civil remedies including a
cause of action for rescission and damages.555 Following years of lower
court and then Supreme Court decisions, the Diet revised the Commodities
Exchange Act in 2004 to clarify the brokers’ “duty to explain” and provide
for civil compensation for breach of that duty.556 In 2004, the Diet revised
the Securities Exchange Act to strengthen civil liability provisions and add a
presumption of causation between breach and damages in certain
549
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circumstances.557 In 2006, the Japanese Diet overhauled all of the laws
regulating financial products and passed the Investment Services Act.558
This new law recognizes multiple private rights of action.559 In short, the
2006 Supreme Court decisions regarding interest rate restrictions and the
subsequent revision of the lending laws are part of a much broader trend that
has and will continue to change the relationship between the Japanese and
the courts. As suggested by Japan’s treatment of usury law and the
consumer finance industry, the increasing recognition of private rights of
action means that civil litigation, the judiciary, and its conception of
substantive justice will play a large role in Japan in the years to come.
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